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Certification: A Practical Device for Early 
Screening of Spurious Antitrust Litigation 
W. Cole Durham, Jr. * and Jonathan A. Dibble** 
Cognizant of the growing need to provide responsible guid- 
ance in the discovery process to prevent abuses in complex cases, 
federal district courts in two pending antitrust cases1 have em- 
ployed an innovative certification procedure to help focus issues 
and assure that discovery does not impose wasteful costs on the 
par tie^.^ Briefly stated, the procedure stays discovery in appropri- 
ate cases3 until the party asserting the claim files a certificate 
specifying a factual basis for concluding first, that the claim is 
brought in good faith, and second, that there is sufficient likeli- 
hood discovery will be f r~ i t fu l .~  Because of certain tensions such 
a procedure creates with regard to the general philosophy of lib- 
eral discovery and notice pleading pervading the Federal Rules of 
Civil Pr~cedure,~ it is bound to be controversial if applied more 
widely. However, while nowhere near as extensive in its ramifica- 
tions as the key proposals for discovery reform currently being 
advanced by the American Bar Association and the Judicial Con- 
ference of the United  state^,^ discovery certification remains an 
* Assistant Professor of Law, J .  Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young Univer- 
sity. A.B., 1972, Harvard University; J.D., 1975, Harvard Law School. 
** B.A., 1970, University of Utah; J.D., 1973, Stanford Law School. Member, Califor- 
nia and Utah State Bars. 
1. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 (D. Utah, filed 
Mar. 23, 1977); Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (D. 
Ore., filed Aug. 6, 1971). 
2. For convenience, and because this procedure requires certification as a precondi- 
tion for obtaining normal discovery, it will be useful to  refer to this device as "discovery 
certification." 
3. See notes 203-10 and accompanying text infra. 
4. For a more detailed description of the procedure, see notes 51-61 and accompany- 
ing text infra. 
5. See notes 138-79 and accompanying text infra. 
6. In the aftermath of the Pound Conference held two years ago, see generally 70 
F.R.D. 79 (1976), the ABA Section of Litigation has presented a series of proposals which 
would narrow the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(l) from the "subject matter" to the 
"issues" involved in an action and woulcfmake a number of minor modifications in the 
rules which would reduce discovery expense in certain circumstances. See SPECIAL COM- 
MITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOVERY ABUSE, SECTION OF LITIGATION OF THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASS'N; REPORT (2d printing and rev. 1977); Lundquist & Schechter, The New Relevancy: 
An End to Trial by Ordeal, 64 A.B.A.J. 59, 59-60 (1978); Lamm, Department of Justice 
Endorses Discovery Rule Changes Proposed by Section, LITIGATION EWS, April 1978, a t  
1. Following up on this proposal, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of 
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attractive procedural device because of its flexibility and utility 
in curbing abuses at the very outset of the discovery process. 
Although it is still too early to evaluate the discovery certifi- 
cation device comprehensively, the procedure clearly warrants 
careful examination. Accordingly, after identifying some of the 
potential abuses which create the need for such a procedure,' this 
Article will analyze the possible bases for a certification order 
within the Federal Rules8 and within the inherent power of dis- 
trict  court^.^ Next, we will examine limitations on the availability 
of certification in view of the liberal pleading and discovery no- 
tions of the Federal Rules.lo Finally, the sanctions available to 
assure effective implementation of a certification procedure will 
be explored. While the certification device might ultimately 
prove to be useful in managing many types of complex litigation, 
our analysis will focus primarily on its use in the antitrust area 
since that is the area in which the device first evolved and in 
which its possible applications are most apparent. 
Forty years of experience under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure have established beyond peradventure the value of 
discovery as a potent tool for advancing the interests of justice in 
the vast majority of cases. In recent years, however, various 
abuses of the discovery procedures have attracted increasing at- 
tention and concern. Chief Justice Burger echoed a mounting 
refrain in his keynote address at the Pound Conference in 1976 
when he stated: 
the Judicial Conference has circulated a preliminary draft of proposed amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dated March 1978. While this draft varies from the ABA 
proposal in some respects, most notably in not explicitly limiting the scope of discovery 
to "issues," it endorses the suggestion of eliminating the phrase from Rule 26(b)(l) which 
suggests that parties may discover anything relevant to the "subject matter involved in 
the pending action." It also follows the recommendation of establishing a discovery confer- 
ence, available as a matter of right in appropriate cases, to' facilitate more efficient and 
better focused discovery. COMMI'ITEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY D m  OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 6-11 (March 1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS], reprinted in 77 F.R.D. 613 (1978). While i t  is still too early to predict the 
impact the proposed changes would have--assuming they are adopted in some form-they 
would no doubt be considerably more far reaching in their effects than the certification 
procedure outlined in this Article. 
7. See notes 12-30 and accompanying text infra. 
8. See notes 62-179 and accompanying text infra. 
9. See notes 180-202 and accompanying text infra. 
10. See notes 203-10 and accompanying text infra. Also see notes 137-79 and accom- 
panying text infra. 
11. See notes 211-34 and accompanying text infra. 
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Increasingly in the past 20 years, responsible lawyers have 
pointed to abuses of the pretrial processes in civil cases. The 
complaint is that misuse of pretrial procedures means that "the 
case must be tried twice." The responsibility for correcting this 
lies with lawyers and judges, for the cure is in our hands.12 
The problem of abuse has become particularly acute in the 
antitrust area where cases typically involve numerous parties, 
complex issues, and voluminous discovery. The seriousness of the 
problem is underscored by the realization that pretrial is increas- 
ingly becoming 'the determinative phase of antitrust litigation .I3 
Discovery is almost always burdensome and in the larger cases 
can be truly staggering. A typical case may necessikate hundreds 
of depositions and may involve thousands, if not millions, of doc- 
uments.14 Wily attorneys have developed techniques for pro- 
pounding literally thousands of questions by using a few carefully 
subdivided and cross-referenced interrogatories.15 Expanded use 
of the class action device in the antitrust area over the past 
decadel%as further multiplied potential discovery burdens?' The 
12. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 
83, 95-96 (1976). 
13. See Withrow & Larm, The "Big" Antitrust Case: 25 Years of Sisyphean Labor, 
62 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5, 7-9 (1976). 
14. See, e.g., Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone 
Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199, 203 (1976). One of the major computer industry cases, Honeywell, 
Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 7 74,874 (D. Minn. 1973), involved 
over 30,000 marked exhibits, some 71 live and 80 canned witnesses, and over 20,000 pages 
of transcript at trial alone. See Withrow & Larm, supra note 13, a t  37. Presumably, the 
quantities of information involved a t  the discovery stage were even more staggering. 
The use of computers in large antitrust cases for storage of information and docu- 
ments is becoming increasingly common. See Arthur, The Computer and the Practice of 
Law: Litigation Support, 63 A.B.A.J. 1737, 1737-40 (1977). This adds another dimension 
to discovery costs. A recent LEXIS sales brochure indicates that the first-year cost of 
converting 8,000 letters averaging one page apiece into computer readable form and mak- 
ing them available for research in LEXIS (i.e., the cost of keystroking, loading, and 
storage) is $15,600. Storage costs in subsequent years would be approximately 18 cents 
per page. MEAD DATA CENTRAL, COMPUTER ASSISTANCE IN LITIGATION: A LAWYER'S GUIDE 9 
(undated). In a large case this could easily run into hundreds of thousands of dollars, not 
including the cost of computer time once the information is stored. Of course, the decision 
to computerize a document depository would reflect a business judgment that computeri- 
zation would ultimately be less expensive than some other form of document manage- 
ment, but the expense is nonetheless very high. 
15. See McElroy, Federal Pre-Trial Procedure in an Antitrust Suit, 31 Sw. L.J. 649, 
682 (1977). 
16. See Withrow & Larm, supra note 13, a t  4. 
17. Other examples of discovery abuse include demands for nationwide discovery in 
local or regional cases, requests for documents and interrogatories which cover excessive 
time periods, inquiries which range too widely into the business and records of subsidiaries 
and divisions, and other types of dragnet demands. Byrnes, Discovery: Its Uses and 
Abuses-The Defendants' Perspective, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 14,24-25 (1975); McElroy, supra 
note 15, at 682. See also Blecher, Is the Class Action Rule Doing the Job? (Plaintiff's 
302 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1978: 
growing tendency to use discovery as a bludgeon has elicited cries 
of "legalized bla~kmail ."~~ The gargantuan economic costs of dis- 
covery are further compounded by less tangible injuries in the 
form of invasion of privacy and psychological disruption of an 
ongoing economic enterprise." In view of the exploding volume of 
information involved in the discovery phase of large cases, Judge 
Renfrew has aptly characterized the procedural transformation 
wrought by the federal rules as a shift from "trial by ambush" to 
"trial by avalanche. " ~ 0  
One of the most deeply troubling perversions of the discovery 
process involves using the threat of expensive discovery costs to 
extort substantial settlements from innocent  defendant^.^' The 
Supreme Court adverted to this problem in Blue Chips Stamps 
u. Manor Drug Stores.22 After noting that extensive and liberal 
discovery of evidence relevant to determining the merits of a 
claim is to be encouraged, the Court observed: 
[TI0 the extent that [discovery] permits a plaintiff with a 
largely groundless claim to simply take up the time of a number 
of other people, with the right to do so representing an in 
terrorern increment of the settlement value, rather than a rea- 
sonably founded hope that the process will reveal relevant evi- 
dence, it is a social cost rather than a benefit.23 
The threat of expensive discovery is particularly acute for the 
small company swept into the large antitrust case as a codefen- 
dant. Facing the risk of joint and several liability that may vastly 
exceed the total worth of the enterprise, as well as a minimum of 
several thousand dollars in litigation expenses during the early 
discovery phase alone, a small company may be driven to settle 
no matter how sincere its belief that it is innocent.24 An unscrupu- 
lous plaintiff can take advantage of this situation by joining a 
large number of defendants, settling with the "smaller fish" for 
a sum which is substantial but less than the projected costs of 
Viewpoint), 55 F.R.D. 365, 365-68 (1972); Malina, The Search for the Pot of Gold, 41 
ANTITRUST L.J. 301, 320 (1972); Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of 
Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 378, 389-91 (1972). 
18. Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust 
Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971). 
19. See, e.g., Kirkham, supra note 14, at 203. 
20. Renfrew, Panel Discussion: Discovery in Civil Antitrust Suits, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 
57, 59 (1975). 
21. See Bymes, supra note 17, at 25. 
22. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
23. Id. at 741. 
24. Kirkham, supra note 14, at 207. 
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defending the action through the early discovery phase, thus 
building a "war chest" to go after larger targets. 
In order to more clearly delineate the dimensions of this 
problem, it will be useful to identify a number of potential sources 
of expense in early antitrust discovery. The figures in the table 
on the following page are based on conservative estimates and 
assumptions extrapolated from actual experience with a number 
of actual cases. 
Despite conscientious efforts to achieve an elusive Aristo- 
telian balance between being analytically thorough and main- 
taining a minimal cost for the client, the defense of a complex 
action will precipitate substantial costs even in the very early 
phases of litigation. An antitrust case, because of the combined 
exposure to large prayers, treble damages, attorneys' fees, injunc- 
tive relief, related subsequent actions, and, in some instances, 
possible criminal sanctions, usually requires a team of two to 
three attorneys. If the action is brought in an area removed from 
the larger metropolitan cities, two law firms will probably be 
retained: the antitrust specialists and the litigating firm admit- 
ted before the bar of the forum state. 
The accompanying table gives a breakdown of the approxi- 
mate attorneys hours involved in the early stages of an antitrust 
case, assuming the involvement of two law firms for the defen- 
dant. 
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TABLE - Estimated Attorney Hours 
in Initial Stages of Litigation pe.r Def endccnt 
Partner 
Hours 
Associate 
Hours 
Review of complaint and file 
Initial discussions with client's executives 
Law firm strategy mapping 
Industry and company background discussion 
with lawyers and employees 
Analysis of possible motions to dismiss; 
further consultation with client; legal research 
Preparation and filing of answer to complaint 
Preparation and filing of counter-claim 
Drafting of first set of interrogatories;'" 
request for production of documents 
Conversations, conferences, correspondence between 
opposing counsel for discovery scheduling, 
stipulations, extensions of time, etc. 
Preparation of answers to plaintiff's interrogatories; 
review of answers with client's employees; review 
and production of defendant's documents for 
plaintiff's inspection; inspection of plaintiff's 
documents 
Analysis of possible further motions to dismiss or for 
summary judgment; legal research 
Data gathering by means of interview, 
affidavit, or deposition26 
Compelling complete discovery-communications with 
plaintiff's counsel, Rule 37 motion, legal research27 
Preparation, filing, and implementing of protective 
orders for sensitive competitive information 
Total attorney time 
25. Defendants7 first set of interrogatories are often aimed at ferreting out the "facts" 
upon which the allegations in the complaint are based. 
26. Hours given include the time expended in preparing for and taking the deposition 
of one person for one day, assuming that a partner from each law firm spends eight hours 
at the deposition and seven hours in witness preparation, and that associates from both 
firms are involved in culling documents, outlining the areas of examination, and otherwise 
laying the groundwork for the deposition. 
Since a complex case would probably require many depositions over many days, 
actual expense in this category could be much greater. Depositions would also include 
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Assuming conser~atively~~ that counsel, with a reputation of com- 
petence to deal with complex litigation, can be retained at  an 
hourly rate of $50 per hour for an associate's time and $75 per 
hour for a partner's or senior litigator's time, attorney billings 
alone would amount to $6,000 for partners' hours and $9,750 for 
associates' hours. In addition, the client must pay paralegal costs 
for examining and culling documents often stored in massive 
numbers in warehouses. Duplicating costs, long distance tele- 
phone bills, and travel expenses also increase the burden. These 
expenses could easily exceed $5,000 within the first several weeks. 
Thus, a defendant in a complex, multiparty case might expect to 
spend well over $20,000 during the initial stages of litigati~n,~' 
and this figure would increase dramatically as more depositions 
were taken. 
This estimate of expenses does not include the defendant's 
own internal costs, such as time spent by in-house counsel and 
other employees in connection with the lawsuit. In addition, 
many costs associated with the defense of complex litigation are 
not easily quantified. Diversion or preoccupation of key company 
executives and other employees may take a significant toll in 
terms of both time and morale. Another unquantifiable cost is the 
possible adverse impact of the suit on the firm's public relations. 
The above expenses represent the initial costs incurred prior 
to the stage where unmeritorious pleadings can be disposed of by 
a motion for summary judgment. Although the stated expenses 
are in a sense arbitrary in that they are not based on a large 
- -- - -- 
court reporter costs which typically involves a minimum of $25 per first hour and $10 per 
hour thereafter, $1.75 per page for the original and one copy, and $0.25 per page for each 
extra copy. 
27. Some of these expenses may be reversed if the judge awards costs; often, however, 
the court only compels discovery. 
28. An idea of just how conservative our figures are can be obtained by comparing 
the fees recently awarded in the sugar industry antitrust litigation. See generally In re 
Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation, Master File No. MDL-201 (N.D. Cal., May 10, 1978) 
(opinion and order regarding attorneys fees). The fees awarded the various attorneys 
ranged from $40 to $175 per hour, with most of the fees awarded to the more experienced 
attorneys ranging between $100 and $125 per hour and fees for associates averaging about 
$65 per hour. 
29. On the other hand, if a complaint seeks temporary or preliminary injunctive 
relief, initial discovery costs escalate dramatically because a tremendous amount of evi- 
dence in affidavits and live testimony must be discovered, digested, and related to the 
finder of fact in a relatively short period of time. And, these costs must still be multiplied 
by the number of defendants to give an idea of the total defense costs involved. It may 
well be that the defendants can, through a joint defense committee, avoid the duplication 
of some of these costs and thereby reduce the burden on each defendant. If the complaint 
involves antitrust allegations, however, each defendant must cautiously avoid any appear- 
ance of concerted action. 
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sample of empirical data, they reflect averages drawn from actual 
cases and have been conservatively reduced. And, for purposes of 
this Article, it is irrelevant whether the figures accurately reflect 
the actual expenditures in any one case or group of cases. Their 
principal purpose is purely to illustrate the potential discovery 
costs defendants may incur in complex litigation. Once a defen- 
dant focuses on the costs associated with participation in a law- 
suit, any lesser amount can serve as a starting point for early 
settlement discussions. 
By thoroughly invoking the process of discovery, the plaintiff 
can possibly find enough evidence to establish a jury issue, and 
in any event can immediately boost the amount of a "nuisance 
value" settlement from the defendants. By pulling everyone in an 
industry into a complex lawsuit dragnet-style and then selling 
peace for a price below the costs of defending the lawsuit, the 
plaintiff can often secure early settlements, thereby augmenting 
its "war chestW3O while simultaneously narrowing the number of 
parties and reducing its prosecution costs. In this setting, the 
pragmatic business man is faced with the dilemma of either in- 
vesting in a fight to protect his honor or capitulating to save 
litigation expenses. Confronted with such a choice, companies 
may well decide to pay a nuisance value settlement rather than 
face an irate board of directors later if the legal expenses escalate 
or the lawsuit is lost. 
A system which tolerates such extortionlike pressures is un- 
just to innocent defendants in unmeritorious actions and may be 
unfair to plaintiffs and contrary to the public interest in some 
meritorious suits. If a real culprit escapes a lawsuit by slipping 
through the net while the confused fisherman sorts the smelt from 
the salmon, society as a whole suffers. Requiring the plaintiffs to 
meet an initial threshold burden through discovery certification 
might prevent such injustices and help litigants and the courts 
focus on the real issues and parties in interest. 
30. A quick rule of thumb would place such settlements anywhere below the early 
costs of defending the lawsuit, as suggested by the following diagram: 
Minimum settlement acceptable "War chest" Early costs of 
to plaintiff < settlements < discovery 
The minimum settlement acceptable for plaintiff would normally approximate his expen- 
ses per defendant or the plaintiff might set an arbitrary minimum so as to "save face." 
A minimum value settlement of $5,000 from 20 of the 28 defendants in Mountain View 
would give plaintiffs a $100,000 "war chest." 
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As indicated at the outset, we are aware of only two cases in 
which a discovery certification procedure has been invoked- 
Portland Retail Druggists Association v. Abbott Lab~ratories,~' 
and Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Labora t~r ie s .~~  Both 
cases involve nebulous antitrust claims brought against several 
major pharmaceutical companies, and the complaint in the 
Mountain View case was apparently modeled on the amended 
complaint in Portland Retail  druggist^.^^ Before proceeding to 
a brief description of the manner in which a certification proce- 
dure would operate and an analysis of the potential value of 
this device in alleviating the problems discussed in the previous 
Section, it will be useful to describe these two cases in some 
detail. 
A. The Case Law Background 
The complaint originally filed in Portland Retail Druggists 
asserted five separate causes of action. The first four were 
Robinson-Patman Act claims and the fifth alleged a conspiracy 
claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The first certification 
order was issued on January 12, 1972, and required the plaintiffs 
to provide "a certificate showing that they currently have infor- 
mation from which the Court can conclude that it is reasonably 
probable that discovery on the merits will produce evidence suffi- 
cient to establish each cause of action."34 A certificate to this end 
was subsequently filed. Thereafter, the case was assigned to a 
second judge who dismissed two of the causes of action35 and 
allowed discovery to go forward on the claim involving discrimi- 
natory sales to nonprofit  institution^.^' After final resolution of 
that portion of the case by the United States Supreme C ~ u r t , ~ '  
31. No. 71-543 (D. Ore., filed Aug. 6, 1971). 
32. No. C-77-0094 (D. Utah, filed Mar. 23, 1977). 
33. The original complaint in Mountain View was in many respects a verbatim copy 
of the amended complaint in Portland Retail Druggists. 
34. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (D. Ore., Jan. 
12, 1972) (first certification order), quoted in Memorandum in Support of the Motion of 
Eli Lilly & Co. for Certification Procedure a t  2, Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott 
Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 (D. Utah, filed Mar. 23, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Eli Lilly 
Memorandum]. 
35. These causes of action alleged Robinson-Patman violations on sales to various 
governmental agencies. See Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n, 425 
U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (1976). 
36. This is the claim which was ultimately disposed of in Abbott Laboratories v. 
Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n, 425 U S .  1 (1976). 
37. Id. 
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the district court ordered the filing of a new certificate addressed 
to the remaining causes of action.38 The plaintiffs subsequently 
filed a certificate that was found to be i n a d e q ~ a t e . ~ ~  On June 30, 
1975, the plaintiffs filed their third certificate. By a letter order 
dated July 18, 1975, the court held that this certificate was still 
inadequate as to the Sherman Act claim.40 On December 27,1977, 
the court severed the conspiracy cause of action and stayed all 
discovery of it. Discovery on the remaining claims was allowed to 
proceed by a bench ruling of March 24, l97Sa4l 
Viewed from the plaintiffs' perspective, the use of the certifi- 
cation procedure in Portland Retail Druggists has delayed discov- 
ery on the Sherman Act claim for over five years. On the other 
hand, the certification procedure has apparently helped the Ore- 
gon federal court manage discovery in a massive case and identify 
issues that could be severed and resolved. At the same time, the 
procedure has protected defendants from burdensome discovery 
on a claim with regard to which plaintiffs have been unable to 
certify a satisfactory factual basis despite having had three dis- 
tinct chances to do so. 
Mountain View, filed March 30, 1977 by thirteen Utah phar- 
macies, also involves multiple Robinson-Patman Act claims and 
an alleged violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. In all re- 
spects the allegations, which refer to all twenty-eight defendants 
en masse, are conclusory and unspecific. The complaint alleges 
that the defendants engaged in unlawful price discrimination41 by 
38. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (D. Ore., Oct. 
10, 1973) (second certification order), cited in Eli Lilly Memorandum, supra note 34, a t  
3. 
39. Id. (Feb. 19, 1974) (order staying discovery pending submission of an adequate 
certificate as ordered on Oct. 10, 1973), cited in Eli Lilly Memorandum, supra note 34, a t  
3. 
40. This letter order stated, inter a h ,  
I have examined, or re-examined, all the certificates filed by plaintiff, in- 
cluding that of June 30, 1975. Some of the materials therein are obviously 
irrelevant: this lawsuit does not and will not concern itself with all the practices 
of the drug industry, however good or evil they may be. Some of these materials 
may be informative, though not of course, necessarily admissible or legally 
probative, on the topic of price discrimination. But none even hints that discov- 
ery would unearth evidence of Sherman Act violations alleged in the Fifth 
Cause. 
Id. (letter order of July 18, 1975) (emphasis in original), quoted in Eli Lilly Memorandum, 
supra note 34, at 3-4. 
41. Memorandum in Support of Response of Portland Defendants to Motion to 
Transfer for Consolidated or Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings Pursuant to Section 1407 
of Title 28, U.S.C. a t  2, In re Pharmaceutical Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. Docket No. 
346 (J.P.M.D.L., filed Apr. 24, 1978). The stay continued in effect as of May 4, 1978. Id. 
42. See 15 U.S.C. # 13 (1976). 
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granting lower prices and more favorable treatment to various 
categories of pharmaceutical purchasers other than plaintiffs. 
Although the Robinson-Patman Act is directed against discrimi- 
natory sales from a particular seller to specific purchasers the 
complaint fails to allege any such discriminatory transactions. 
The complaint also does not identify the products purportedly 
involved. The broad conclusory allegations that all defendants 
violated the Sherman Act appear to be the only basis upon which 
separate Robinson-Patman Act claims against the separate de- 
fendants could be combined in a single 
After a flurry of motions,43 the court dismissed certain claims 
relating to transactions exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act," 
stayed all discovery pending a further order of the court, and 
granted plaintiffs three weeks in which to file a motion for leave 
to amend the complaint.45 The plaintiffs filed such a motion at- 
taching, as ordered, a draft of an amended complaint. Arguing 
that the amended complaint contained no more substance than 
did the original, counsel for Abbott Laboratories suggested a pro- 
cedure that would require the plaintiffs to submit a sworn state- 
ment or certificate setting forth "all facts known to plaintiffs 
which are sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that dis- 
covery in the action will provide evidentiary facts relevant to and 
probative of" various allegations in the c ~ m p l a i n t . ~ ~  
On January 16, 1978, the court granted the defense motion 
for certification and made a bench ruling to that effect which was 
clarified in a letter to all counsel two days later. The written 
42.1. For a discussion of the problems in bringing such multiple claims, see Note, 
Class Actions Under the Robinson-Patman Act: Gold Strike May Be Only Iron Pyrite, 25 
Stan. L. Rev. 764 (1973). 
43. While some defendants answered the complaint, others filed various motions to 
dismiss and motions for summary judgment. One group of defendants filed a motion to 
dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion to require plaintiffs to "separately state their 
claims," purportedly pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b). Memorandum of 
Points and Authority in Support of Defendant Smith, Kline & French Laboratories Mo- 
tion for Summary Judgment, Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Separately State. Several 
defendants sought an order to delay first wave discovery until the motions were decided. 
Others argued that defendants should be allowed to conduct "transaction discovery" to 
obtain more specific details about the plaintiffs' allegations after which appropriate mo- 
tions could be filed. Memorandum of Certain Defendants Concerning Pretrial Scheduling. 
44. Sales to  hospitals and other nonprofit organizations "for their own use" are speci- 
fically exempted from the Robinson-Patman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1976). See also Abbott 
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists A s h ,  425 U.S. 1 (1976). Sales to any govern- 
mental entity have been interpreted as exempt from the Act. 38 Op. Att'y Gen. 539 (1936). 
45. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 (D. Utah, Sept. 
6, 1977) (order reflecting rulings of Aug. 15, 1977 scheduling conference). 
46. Letter from W. Robert Wright to Judge Aldon J. Anderson (Sept. 12, 1977) (filed 
with the clerk of the court Sept. 13, 1977). 
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order, entered January 28, required plaintiffs to file "sworn state- 
ments setting forth all facts presently known to them, if any, 
which support their belief that they possess meritorious claims 
under the Sherman and Robinson-Patman A~ts ."~ '  The authori- 
zation for this procedure emanated, according to the letter to 
counsel, from the court's "inherent power and . . . compelling 
duty to actively manage cases of the magnitude of the present 
action."48 Apparently searching for a specific basis in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure for the certificate requirement, the court 
seemed to rely on its power to attach conditions to a grant of leave 
to amend under Rule 15. Consistent with its opinion "that the 
entire focus of the action at  this stage should be upon plaintiffs 
substantiating the proposed amended complaint," the court or- 
dered all pending defense motions "to be held in abeyance until 
the ordered certification procedure has run its course and all 
questions and motions relevant thereto are resolved."49 The plain- 
tiffs filed a certificate and its sufficiency has been challenged by 
the defendants .50 
B. The Basic Structural Features of a Discovery 
Certification Procedure 
At this point, a brief description of the general contours of 
the procedure emerging from the foregoing discussion of Portland 
Retail Druggists and Mountain View will be useful. The certifica- 
tion procedure could be invoked a t  any time after the filing of the 
initial pleadings, either upon motion by a party against whom the 
action was directed or sua sponte by the judge to whom the case 
was assigned. For the certification procedure to be maximally 
effective, it is vital that the judge act on the motion requesting 
certification as promptly as possible. Normally he would be able 
to assess whether certification was appropriate merely by reading 
the complaint and determining whether the risk of discovery 
abuse was sufficiently great to warrant certification. In some 
cases, the judge may not be in a position to act promptly or may 
47. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 (D. Utah, Jan. 
28, 1978) (certification order). The variations in the language of the certificate require- 
ments are set out in notes 53-55 and accompanying text infra. 
48. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 (D. Utah, Jan. 
18, 1978) (judge's letter to all counsel). 
49. Id. 
50. The Mountain View plaintiffs have moved for transfer of the Utah action to 
Oregon for consolidated pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. fi 1407 (1970). In re 
Pharmaceutical Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. Docket No. 346 (J.P.M.D.L., filed Apr. 24, 
1978). 
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wish to hear both sides before ruling on the certification motion. 
In such cases, the judge may wish to stay discovery pending his 
ruling on the certification request in order to minimize the risk 
of discovery abuse during the (hopefully brief) intervening period. 
Assuming the judge decided to require certification, an order 
would be issued that would set a reasonable deadline for filing a 
certificate and that ideally would specify the type of information 
to be included in the certificate. The court could also determine 
in its discretion whether counsel should be required to set forth 
the facts in a sworn statement, or simply be bound by the stan- 
dard sanctions of Rule ll? 
In general, a certificate should be deemed adequate when, in 
view of the circumstances of the case and the nature of the claim, 
the plaintiff has adduced sufficient information to establish that 
his claim is made in good faith and that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe discovery will yield information relevant to an 
identifiable claim. This standard may be met affirmatively by 
including such information in the certificate, or negatively by 
showing that, despite good faith efforts, it has been impossible to 
obtain information of the type or degree of particularity specified 
in the certification order and that there is some reason to believe 
the information is so exclusively within the control of the defen- 
dant that only discovery would disclose its existence or nonexis- 
tence. Of course, the arguments advanced to meet the standard 
negatively would include all those made against certification in 
the first place. Normally, then, in order to establish the adequacy 
of the certificate in this manner, it would be necessary for a 
plaintiff to bring to the court's attention some consideration that 
was not raised in the initial arguments against granting a certifi- 
cation request. 
In light of the nature of the certification standard just pos- 
ited, the Portland Retail Druggists order may have demanded too 
much by requiring the plaintiff to include information indicating 
that there was a "reasonable probability" that "discovery on the 
merits [would] produce evidence sufficient to establish each 
cause of action."52 A plaintiff could conceivably have sufficient 
information to show a reasonable probability that discovery 
would be fruitful even though additional evidence from other 
sources would then be necessary to establish some or all of the 
claims. A certification order which required the plaintiff essen- 
51. See notes 100-01 and accompanying text infra. 
52. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (D. Ore., Jan. 
12, 1972) (first certification order), quoted in Eli Lilly Memorandum, supra note 34, at 2. 
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tially to prove his case before allowing discovery would clearly 
demand too much. 
A similar problem arises with respect to the Mountain View 
court's order requiring plaintiffs to disclose "all facts presently 
known to them . . . which support their belief that they possess 
meritorious claims."53 While a defendant ought to be able to as- 
certain whether the plaintiff is capable of making a minimal 
threshold showing that he has good grounds for his complaint, 
this does not imply that he has a right to learn all that the plain- 
tiff knows before discovery begins.54 These examples emphasize 
the fact that great care should be given to properly limiting the 
scope of the certification request if certification is to become a 
legitimate discovery management device. 
The approach suggested by the Mountain View court's letter 
to counsel is arguably preferable in that it merely asked plaintiffs 
to "[set] forth the [as opposed to "all"] facts known to them, 
if any, which support their belief that they possess meritorious 
claims."55 While not as clear as the standard proposed at  the 
outset of this Subsection, this certification order has the advan- 
tage of clearly focusing the attention of the parties and the court 
on whether the plaintiff has a good faith basis for bringing the 
action rather than on the quantum of evidence already in the 
plaintiffs possession. The principle drawback of the Mountain 
View order is that it leaves the plaintiff with considerable uncer- 
tainty as to the precise standard the court will use to determine 
the sufficiency of the certificate. This difficulty could have been 
reduced if the court had detailed more fully the type of informa- 
tion that would be adequate to withstand a sufficiency challenge 
and permit discovery to procede normally. For example, the court 
might have required the plaintiff to provide particulars regarding 
the factual basis for thinking discovery would show that the de- 
fendant was somehow connected with harm suffered by the plain- 
tiff. 
Since the purpose of certification is merely to protect a de- 
fendant from unjustifiable discovery costs, and not to cut off a 
plaintiff's claim, a plaintiff who has filed a certificate subse- 
quently deemed inadequate should be given a reasonable num- 
- -- 
53. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 (D. Utah, Jan. 
28, 1978) (certification order). 
54. See notes 205-08 and accompanying text infra. 
55. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 (D. Utah, Jan. 
18, 1978) (judge's letter to all counsel). The bench ruling had ordered plaintiffs to "provide 
facts through affidavit showing the factual basis upon which the claims made have been 
alleged." Transcript of the Proceedings a t  46 (Jan. 16, 1978). 
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ber of opportunities for revision. Resulting delays would gener- 
ally protect rather than prejudice the defendant, and appropriate 
adjustments could be made in exceptional cases. If, after re- 
peated attempts, a plaintiff has been unable to meet the minimal 
informational demands of a certificate order, the underlying 
claim may properly be dismissed. Such a dismissal should be 
overturned only if abuse of discretion is found. 
The workability of discovery certification, as with other pro- 
cedural mechanisms, depends to a large extent on the availability 
of appropriate sanctions. The possibility that an unwarranted 
certification motion might be filed could be deterred by allowing 
a court in its discretion to tax the defendant with the plaintiff's 
costs occasioned by the motion. The range of sanctions for plain- 
tiff noncompliance with certification requirements is necessarily 
more complex and will be dealt with in detail later.56 
In addition to sanctions for the abuse of or noncompliance 
with discovery certification, certain variations on the procedure 
could be developed. In some cases, it may be that the interests 
of justice and expeditious management of discovery will be better 
served if a party is presented with the alternative of either certify- 
ing or being allowed to engage in limited discovery upon the 
condition of paying the direct and indirect costs of such discovery 
to the defendant (or of posting bond for such costs in the event 
that the allegations turn out to be ~nfounded).~ '  Such an alterna- 
tive order would have the advantage of allowing discovery to go 
forward where the plaintiff was sufficiently convinced of the va- 
lidity of his claim to bear the initial risk of discovery, while at  the 
same time insulating the defendant from the costs of potentially 
abusive discovery. The fact that a plaintiff would assume this 
type of financial burden is obviously a very strong indicator that 
the plaintiff's claim is genuine, and it is difficult to imagine cir- 
cumstances in which a plaintiff willing to bear the risk of loss on 
discovery costs should not be allowed to proceed.5R Once a plain- 
56. See notes 211-34 and accompanying text infra. 
57. There would, of course, be difficulties in quantifying the less tangible costs of 
gathering such information. But courts continually deal with such valuation problems, 
and there is no reason to think that the cost to a defendant of a plaintiff's discovery would 
be inherently unquantifiable. 
58. Of course, if a plaintiff thought discovery costs were greater than possible discov- 
ery benefits, it would be reasonable to utilize the certification device to bar the plaintiff 
from proceeding with discovery indefinitely, since it is difficult to see why the defendant 
should incur costs that the plaintiff himself would be unwilling to pay. A possible excep- 
tion to this generalization arises where the cost to the plaintiff of finding certain informa- 
tion is much greater than the cost to the defendant. Certain price information, for exam- 
ple, might be easily accessible to the defendant, but might be difficult and costly for a 
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tiff gleans sufficient information to file an adequate certificate 
pursuant to an alternative orderAof this type, discovery would be 
allowed to go forward on a normal basis and, if the plaintiff ulti- 
mately prevailed on the merits, his expenses in financingjnitial 
discovery costs could be recouped to the extent that such costs 
are normally taxed to the losing party. 
I t  should be noted that a discovery certificate is not merely 
a kind of particularized pleading. If i t  were, issuance of a certifi- 
cation order would imply that the pleading against which the 
order was directed was legally insufficient. But there is no reason 
to think that such would be the case. A judge requiring certifica- 
tion might well consider the initial pleadings sufficient to toll a 
statute of limitations or withstand an immediate motion to dis- 
miss. In contrast to an amended pleading, a discovery certificate 
does not supplant a prior pleading; it merely adds to the store of 
information available for identification and ultimate resolution of 
disputed issues without affecting the validity of the original com- 
plaint or counterclaim. In this regard, it resembles discovery 
more closely than pleading. Certification may best be thought of 
as a hybrid procedure intermediate between pleading and full- 
blown discovery, but conceptually distinct from both. 
A certification procedure with the features just described can 
serve a number of purposes. First, and perhaps most important, 
i t  is a means whereby certain forms of discovery abuses can be 
constrained if not eliminated. The tactic of filing an action and 
then settling for an amount below the defense startup costs would 
be emasculated in cases where there is no reasonable basis for the 
claim. The procedure may also be of assistance to the trial judge 
in supervising the course of discovery. As in the Portland Retail 
Druggists case, it may well be that certification will result in a 
plaintiff to find if it were simply allowed to fish through a sea of documents. A parallel 
problem arises in the context of administering Federal Rule 33(c), which allows a party 
to answer interrogatories simply by specifying the records from which the answer may be 
derived and allowing the party serving the interrogatories to inspect them. This procedure 
is theoretically available only when "the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer is 
substantially the same for the party serving the interrogatory as for the party served." FED. 
R. CIV. P. 33(c). The difficulty, of course, is assessing when the burdens are sufficiently 
similar on the opposing parties to allow this shifting of discovery costs. See 8 C. WRIGHT 
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACITCE AND PROCEDURE 5 2178, a t  570-71 (1970) [hereinafter cited 
as WRIGHT & MILLER]. Presumably, a court exercising its discretion in the certification 
context could evaluate relative production burdens and tailor an alternative certification 
order accordingly. One must also remember that, generally, a plaintiff who knows enough 
to specify why eliciting particular information will be much more costly for himself than 
for the opposing party probably has sufficient information to  comply with a certification 
order. 
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determination by a judge that discovery should go forward on 
certain aspects of a plaintiff's claim, but be postponed as to other 
more nebulous claims. This gives the plaintiff additional time to 
formulate the factual basis for a claim in more questionable areas 
while allowing discovery to proceed where there is good ground to 
think i t  will be fruitful. 
Perhaps the most significant practical problem with the cer- 
tification procedure derives from the fact that it is as yet essen- 
tially an untested device. There is no way a t  this point to deter- 
mine with any precision how effective it is at  actually eliminating 
the costs which create the leverage for extortionlike ~e t t l e rnen t s .~~  
In fairness, i t  must be recognized that many of the costs asso- 
ciated with early discovery will continue to accrue whether or not 
certification is invoked. While some of the larger expenses, such 
as deposition costs, preparation of answers to the plaintiff's inter- 
rogatories, and costs deriving from discovery disputes would ob- 
viously be eliminated pending submission of an adequate certifi- 
cate, others, such as those for filing responsive pleadings and 
analyzing possible bases for dismissal or summary judgment, 
would probably continue." Particularly in cases as large as those 
in which certification would likely be invoked, parties and coun- 
sel are unlikely to hold off planning defense strategy pending 
compliance with a certification order. 
The continuation of these expenses, however, does not neces- 
sarily impugn the certification procedure's workability. The 
ongoing costs may reflect concerns either that the plaintiff does 
have a viable claim or that the judicial system may fail to detect 
a groundless one. These costs therefore are attributable not to a 
defect in the certification procedure but to the defendant's own 
uncertainty as to the strength of its position or to risks inherent 
in the judicial process. The certification procedure would operate 
to hold such "insurance" expenses at  an unburdensome level, and 
particularly where a defendant is confident that a complaint is 
59. In the Mountain View case, for example, a number of stipulated dismissals have 
been entered since the entry of the certification order in January. See, e.g., Mountain View 
Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 (D. Utah, Mar. 9, 1978) (order dismiss- 
ing defendant Squibb); id. (May 18, 1978) (order dismissing defendant Hoechst-Roussel 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.). Of course, it is difficult to know whether such dismissals reflect 
nuisance value settlements or legitimate settlements based upon realistic assessment of 
the merits. To the extent they reflect the latter, their existence is no indictment of the 
practicality of certification, since it was never intended to impede settlement on the 
merits. Indeed, its purpose is to promote that end by insuring that settlements do not 
occur simply because of the burdens associated with the defense of unfounded claims. 
60. See table a t  p. 304, supra. 
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groundless, will act as a good insulator against unjustifiable ex- 
pense. 
Moreover, even if certification does not entirely eliminate 
costs extrinsic to the risk of loss on the merits, it certainly alters 
the atmosphere in which settlement negotiations would occur. 
The defendant's cost of continued involvement in the action is 
reduced a t  least temporarily because the risk of incurring sub- 
stantial discovery costs is largely eliminated. In addition, if a 
court imposes sanctions for a plaintiff's failure to comply with a 
certification order, the defendant may ultimately be able to re- 
coup all its costs incurred in defending the action?' Thus, while 
there may be some defendants who feel the only way to "stop the 
meter" and avoid the costs flowing from involvement in an anti- 
trust action is to enter into a nuisance value settlement, the certi- 
fication device still has considerable utility. Finally, recognition 
of a certification procedure would give the judge an identifiable 
tool to restrain early discovery abuse and would eliminate the 
problem of his constantly having second thoughts about which of 
the numerous potential bases for the exercise of his discretion is 
specifically being called into play. 
The fact that the certification device may constitute a useful 
technique for constraining certain forms of discovery abuse does 
not, of course, insure that the procedure is authorized. In fact, one 
of the major problems with which the Portland Retail Druggists 
and Mountain View courts wrestled was precisely whether they 
had the power to stay discovery pending submission of an ade- 
quate certificate. This Section will analyze the various possible 
bases for such power within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and within the inherent power of a court insofar as it bears on this 
issue." To the extent that this analysis identifies limits on, as well 
as grounds for, judicial power to require certification, i t  necessar- 
ily prefigures the discussion of limitations on the scope of the 
procedure in Section IV.63 
61. See notes 223-34 and accompanying text infra. 
62. See notes 180-202 and accompanying text infra. 
63. See notes 203-10 and accompanying text infra. 
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A. Specific Bases in the Federal Rules 
I .  Rule 15 
The judge in the Mountain View case apparently felt most 
comfortable in basing his decision to require certification on his 
discretionary power to attach conditions to the grant of leave to 
file an amended ~omplaint. '~ Rule 15 provides that, except for one 
amendment which is allowed as a matter of course prior to the 
filing of a responsive pleading, "a party may amend his pleading 
only by  leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party 
. . . ."65 Similarly, the "court may, upon reasonable notice and 
upon such terms as are just, permit [a party] to serve a supple- 
mental pleading . . . ."" Since it is well settled that in appropri- 
ate circumstances a court may deny leave to amend ~u t r igh t , '~  
may impose suitable conditions upon the grant of leave to 
amend,68 or may even require a party to amend a pleading that 
fails to adequately state a claim in order to avoid dismissal,fig 
there would appear to be no obstacle to requiring certification as 
a condition for amending or supplementing pleadings, so long as 
this results in no infraction of the liberal amendment policies of 
Rule 15. As a practical matter, since the great majority of compli- 
cated cases are based upon amended or supplemental pleadings 
by the time they reach trial, Rule 15 would be available as a basis 
for certification in a wide range of cases. 
Of course, one of the key premises of Rule 15 is that "leave 
shall be freely given when justice so requires."70 While the deter- 
64. See Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 (D. Utah, 
Jan. 18, 1978) (judge's letter to all counsel). 
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) (emphasis added). 
66. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d). 
67. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330-31 
(1971) (denial justified in light of substantial prejudice to opposing party); Heart Disease 
Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1972) (first 
amended complaint had already failed to allege sufficient facts to support a "bare bones" 
antitrust conspiracy claim); Miller v. Steinbach, 43 F.R.D. 275, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) 
(denial where allegations were identical to counts of original complaint which had already 
been dismissed and stricken). 
68. See, e.g., Firchau v. Diamond Nat'l Corp., 345 F.2d 269, 275 (9th Cir. 1965); 
Hayes v. Parkview-Gem of Hawaii, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 436, 442 (D. Hawaii 1976); Prandini 
v. National Tea Co., 62 F.R.D. 503, 506 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Sherrell v. Mitchell Aero, Inc., 
340 F. Supp. 219, 222 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Thermal Dynamics Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 
42 F.R.D. 607, 609 (D.N.H. 1967); Chamberlin v. United Eng'rs & Constructors, Inc., 194 
F. Supp. '647, 651 (E.D. Pa. 1961); 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 7 15.08, at 935 (2d ed. 
1974) [hereinafter cited as MOORE]; 6 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, § 1486, a t  423- 
24 (1971). 
69. 6 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, 5 1473, a t  376 (1971); see Benner v. Philadel- 
phia Musical Soc'y Local 77, 32 F.R.D. 197, 199 (E.D. Pa. 1963). 
70. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). 
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mination of whether leave to amend should be granted rests with 
the discretion of the trial court," the liberal amendment policy 
articulated by the wule demands that there be some justification 
for denial of leave. Generally, this takes the form of a showing 
that the opposing party would be prejudiced in some manner if 
leave were granted.72 As the Supreme Court has suggested in 
discussing the liberality with which amendments should be per- 
mitted: 
If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plain- 
tiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an 
opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any 
apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith or 
dilatory motive o n  the  part of the movant, repeated failure to 
cure deficiencies by  amendments  previously allowed, undue 
prejudice to  the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the 
amendment ,  futil i ty o f  amendment ,  etc.-the leave sought 
should, as the rules require, be "freely given."73 
The Court's catalog of the situations in which leave might be 
denied has close affinities with the factors that would justify a 
judge in requiring ~er t i f ica t ion.~~ The central purpose of the certi- 
fication procedure is to help eliminate abuses in the early phases 
of discovery which may reflect bad faith, bludgeon tactics, or 
failure to possess or adequately articulate a claim, and which 
could prejudice an opposing party by causing inconvenience and 
possibly, in the event of a nuisance value settlement, preclude a 
determination on the merits. Conditioning leave to amend on the 
submission of an adequate certificate would thus appear to be 
well within the limits of a court's discretion under Rule 15, partic- 
ularly since a certification order is considerably less drastic than 
denying leave to amend. 
A few cases have suggested that "a district court will not use 
its power under Rule 15(a) to require amendments for the sole 
purpose of obtaining evidentiary details that would be available 
through the discovery process."75 Superficially, such holdings 
appear to run counter to the philosophy behind the certification 
procedure. The cases involved, however, are clearly distinguish- 
able from the situations in which the certification procedure 
71. The trial court's exercise of discretion is not subject to appellate review except 
for abuses of discretion. Ziegler v. Akin, 261 F.2d 88, 90 (10th Cir. 1958). 
72. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330-31 (1971). 
73. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (emphasis added). 
74. See notes 208-09 and accompanying text infra. 
75. 6 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, 4 1473, at 377 (1971) (footnote omitted). 
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would be appropriate. One such case, Mahon v. Bennett,76 was a 
simple two-party breach of contract action where the defendant 
sought specific details about the contract. Where a case is thus 
lacking in complexity and the issues are sufficiently well defined 
that discovery may proceed in an orderly manner, the parties may 
properly be directed to seek such information through discovery. 
The use of either Rule 15(a) or discovery certification in such a 
setting would be equally inappropriate. In another case, Galdi v. 
Jones," the Second Circuit overturned a default judgment en- 
tered upon failure of the plaintiff to comply with an order requir- 
ing very detailed particularization of the facts undergirding his 
claim. The court's decision was predicated on the availability of 
discovery. The facts in this case were more analogous in complex- 
ity to those in a case appropriate for certification, but the nature ' 
of the particularization required differed appreciably from that 
which would be proper in a discovery certificate. The certifying 
party is not required to show the facts which substantiate a claim, 
but rather the facts that provide some basis for believing discov- 
ery might yield evidentiary facts. As in Mahon, the fact that the 
parties in Galdi were correctly relegated to discovery procedures 
rather than granted a remedy rooted in Rule 15(a) does not imply 
that a Rule 15(a) based certification procedure is never appropri- 
ate. 
2. Rule 16 
Under Rule 16 the court in its discretion may direct counsel 
to appear a t  a pretrial conference to consider, in addition to spe- 
cifically enumerated issues, "[sluch other matters as may aid in 
the disposition of the action."78 This provision has been inter- 
preted as a source of broad discretion for the trial court;7g there- 
fore, the court is free to choose from a wide variety of mechanisms 
to clarify the issues and avoid unnecessary costs. In those instan- 
ces where the discovery process threatens to become a source of 
overwhelming expense to parties brought into the action on the 
basis of sweeping, unspecific allegations, certification would ap- 
pear to be a legitimate and useful device that could be wielded 
by a court in connection with a pretrial conference under the 
auspices of Rule 16. 
76. 6 F.R.D. 213 (W.D. Mo. 1946). 
77. 141 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1944). 
78. FED. R. CIV. P. 16. 
79. 3 MOORE, supra note 68, T[ 16.16 (2d ed. 1974). 
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The purposes of the pretrial conference have been explained 
by Professor Moore: 
One of the prime purposes of the Federal Rules is to expe- 
dite the disposition of cases and lessen the cost of litigation. 
This is indicated in Rule 1. . . . The pre-trial conference under 
Rule 16 plays an important part in achieving this purpose. The 
rule establishes legal machinery whereby the court, as well as 
the parties, may participate in . . . the sifting of issues and 
evidence in actions pending before it, with the view of simplify- 
ing, shortening and possibly avoiding a trial. The chief purposes 
. . . are to define and simplify the issues . . . . 80 
Rule 16 has been seen as promoting goals very similar to those of 
the discovery rules,s1 but the objectives are not identical nor are 
the procedures inter~hangeable.~~ In fact, Professors Wright and 
Miller note that "as a result of the simplified pleading allowed 
under Rule 8 and the broad, frequently unstructured, discovery 
permitted by Rules 26 through 37, greater reliance must be placed 
on the pretrial hearing as the vehicle for informing the parties of 
precisely what is in controversy. "s3 
Many courts have held that the pretrial conference should be 
conducted a t  the conclusion of discoverys4 and commentators 
have agreed that this is the normal practice.85 In complex and 
protracted cases, however, pretrial conferences have been recog- 
nized as valuable tools in guiding and structuring the discovery 
process itself? Indeed, the Manual for Complex L i t i g a t i ~ n , ~ ~  
80. Id. 7 16.02, a t  1105-06 (footnotes omitted). 
81. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). 
82. 6 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, 4 1528, a t  615 (1971). 
83. Id. 5 1522, a t  567-68 (footnote omitted). 
84. See, e.g., Commercial Ins. Co. v. Smith, 417 F.2d 1330, 1334 (10th Cir. 1969). 
85. 3 MOORE, supra note 68, 77 16.08, 16.16, at  1126 (2d ed. 1974) ("normally"); 6 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, § 1524, a t  580 (1971). Wright and Miller note that three 
jurisdictions (Alaska, Connecticut, and Nebraska) have local rules requiring completion 
of discovery before pretrial. Id. at  580 n.50. 
86. 3 MOORE, supra note 68, 16.08 (2d ed. 1974). See also Leumi Financial Corp. v. 
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 295 F. Supp. 539, 542-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
Wright and Miller note that "preliminary utilization of pretrial conferences would 
enable the court to define the issues and eliminate unnecessary discovery . . . ." 6 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, § 1530, a t  625 (1971) (emphasis added) (footnote omit- 
ted). In complicated cases, to be effective for these ends the pretrial narrowing of issues 
must precede discovery. See Life Music, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 31 F.R.D. 3, 5 
(S.D.N.Y. 1962). Where the pleadings make only generalized, conclusory allegations, the 
impetus for very early conferences is even greater. Certification at the pretrial conference 
stage would help to determine whether discovery is appropriate a t  all by evaluating 
whether the plaintiff has a good faith basis for bringing the claim. 
87. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (rev. ed. 1977). The title was changed from 
Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation to clarify that the Manual is recom- 
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which would typically be applicable in cases amenable to certifi- 
cation, specifically provides for the use of four pretrial confer- 
encesgg as a means of controlling complex actions. The Manual 
sugge$s that the first such conference, known as the preliminary 
or scheduling conference, take place before any discovery pro- 
ceedings commence to permit the court to discuss with counsel 
the basic issues and attempt to determine what pretrial proce- 
dures may be necessary.89 As a rule, the preliminary conference 
will include discussion of the possibility of an early settlementm 
and notification to the parties that preclusion orders will issue for 
noncompliance with pretrial orders.91 
With its recognition that flexibility is a key to discovery man- 
agement, and that pretrial conferences may be modified as the 
judge sees fit in light of the circumstances of a particular case,g2 
the Manual provides additional support for the propriety of dis- 
covery certification. The decision to issue a certification order can 
be viewed simply as a manifestation of the kind of flexible guid- 
ance recommended by the Manual. Moreover, certification can 
be used to complement the procedures the Manual outlines. But, 
mended in all civil and criminal actions and not exclusively for multidistrict litigation. 
Id. at xx. 
The Manual defines complex litigation as "one case or two or more related cases 
which present unusual problems and which require extraordinary treatment, including 
but not limited to the cases designated as 'protracted' and 'big.' " Id. § 0.10, at 4. Complex 
or multidistrict litigation is defined by Wright and Miller as litigation "involving 'either 
large numbers of plaintiffs, suing in many district courts on essentially the same facts, or 
many complex and interrelated issues which require the evaluation of large quantitites of 
data.'." 6 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, 4 1530, a t  626-27 (1971) (citing Comment, 
Observations on the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, 68 MICH. L. REV. 
303, 303 (1969)). 
88. Each conference is structured in greater detail than is outlined in Rule 16. See 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 4 4 0.40, 1.00, 2.00, 3.00 & 4.00 (rev. ed. 1977). 
89. See id. 5 1.10. At the first conference, timetables are set for the first wave of 
discovery, which is designed to disclose the names and location of witnesses whose written 
interrogatories or depositions may be sought and the existence, location, and custodian 
of documents and other physical evidence. Id. 0 4  0.10, 1.50. Consolidation and joinder 
matters are also discussed. Id. § 1.60. 
90. Id. 0 1.21. 
91. Id. § 1.11. 
92. The Manual recognizes that ''[all1 of the suggested procedures are not suitable 
for every complex case; nor are they necessarily the best that can be devised. Judges and 
lawyers, therefore, are encouraged to improve them and to adapt them to the particular 
case being processed . . . ." Id. at  4. "It is not intended, however, to recommend an 
inflexible program of holding only four principal pretrial conferences. The suggestions 
made herein are subject always to the discretion of each judge to deviate and innovate 
where necessary or desirable." Id. 4 0.40, a t  12 (emphasis added). 
"[F]lexibility in applying the directives for pretrials is the key to effective and 
sensible Court administration of [Rule 161." Pollack, Pretrial Conferences, 50 F.R.D. 451, 
465 (1970). 
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since the first conference does not usually take place until a t  least 
a month or two after the action is filed, it may not come soon 
enough to deal with the types of problems certification is designed 
to handle. The filing of a certification motion, however, may alert 
the judge to the need for an expedited pretrial schedule and may 
help structure the first conference. 
While the Manual generally tends to buttress the notion of 
certifi~ation,'~ there is one particular in which it appears to de- 
tract from it. The current Manual's introduction notes that some 
procedures suggested in its precursor, the Handbook of Recorn- 
mended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases,g4 are no 
longer encouraged. One of these is specified as the "unsound 
practice of staying of discovery until the issues are formed."95 
Although this language could be construed as an indictment of 
the certification procedure, its actual concern is quite different. 
The Manual's objection is directed against a wooden insistence 
that issues be framed before discovery can proceed. Certification 
is less demanding and more flexible. While it does prompt some 
measure of issue crystalization, its primary concern is with the 
imposition of unjustifiable discovery costs on an innocent party 
rather than with neat organization of the issues. The standards 
of compliance are minimal and the procedure can be tailored to 
stay discovery on all or merely some aspects of a case until suffi- 
cient foundational data is supplied by the plaintiff. In contrast 
to the problem identified by the Manual, it does not insist on full 
elaboration of issues as a prerequisite to discovery. 
Use of the certification procedure to permit better court 
management of the discovery process through pretrial confer- 
ences may find even stronger support in the Federal Rules if the 
proposed amendment to add subsection (f) to Rule 26 is adopted. 
That amendment would allow any party to request a "discovery 
conference" as a matter of right a t  "any time after commence- 
ment of an action," provided "that counsel . . . has made a rea- 
sonable effort with opposing counsel to reach agreement on the 
matters set f ~ r t h  in the request."" The committee proposing the 
amendment contemplates that the discovery conference would be 
confined to "the exceptional case" where "early intervention by 
93. The Manual specifically notes that by following its suggestions a judge may 
"prevent abuse of discovery in complex cases by any and all parties." MANAUL FOR COM- 
PLEX LITIGATION 8 0.60 (rev. ed. 1977). 
94. 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960). 
95. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 3 n.3 (rev. ed. 1977). 
96. 1978 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 6, at 7-8, 11. 
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the court appears preferable to a series of motions to compel or 
to limit d isco~ery ."~~ A district judge in a complex case might 
usefully require a plaintiff who has filed a nebulous complaint to  
submit a discovery certificate a t  an initial discovery conference 
to ascertain whether there is good ground for imposing the bur- 
dens of discovery.* In some cases, of course, it may be more 
fruitful simply to hold the conference without insisting on the 
formality of discovery certification. In larger cases, however, cer- 
tification may prove to be a useful device to help answer thresh- 
old questions about the need for discovery in general and as to 
particular claims. 
Some might object to the use of the pretrial conference under 
the present rules as a device for early control of discovery on the 
ground that the pretrial conference is intended to narrow the 
issues by encouraging agreement among the parties themselves. 
As expressed by the Reporter to the Supreme Court's Advisory 
Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, "the proper function of 
pre-trial is not to club [one party] . . . into submission," but 
rather the emphasis is upon agreement of the parties? The certi- 
fication procedure, however, is not a means of coercion but rather 
a means of ascertaining that there exists a basis for subjecting a 
defendant to discovery and its attendant costs. This lack of coer- 
cive effect is emphasized by the very minimal factual showing 
required of the plaintiff. Any plaintiff who has a valid basis for 
believing discovery will produce necessary information would be 
permitted to proceed. 
Although no one has yet sought discovery certification on the 
basis of Rule 16, there appears to be no reason why the power to 
convene pretrial conferences could not be interpreted as implic- 
itly authorizing the use of certification during the initial stages 
of a case for the purpose of pretrial scrutiny of loosely drawn, 
sprawling complaints which name any number of peripheral de- 
fendants and involve complex issues of a magnitude that would 
inflict substantial discovery costs on the parties and the courts. 
97. Id. at 11. 
98. Cf. Von Poppenheim v. Portland Boxing & Wrestling Comm'n, 442 F.2d 1047 (9th 
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039 (1972) (action dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) 
because of repeated failure of plaintiff to provide court with statement of particulars from 
which basis for Sherman Act claim could be inferred). 
99. Clark, To an Understanding Use of Pre-Trial, 29 F.R.D. 454,456 (1961). See also 
J.F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 
1976) (nothing in Rule 16 gives trial court power to force stipulation of facts). Cf. Life 
Music, Inc. v. Edelstein, 309 F.2d 242,243 (2d Cir. 1962) (the court may tentatively define 
issues basically agreed upon by attorneys despite lack of formal assent); Renfrew, supra 
note 20. at 60 (if attorneys do not find ways to limit discovery burdens, the judiciary will). 
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Such a procedure would seem to be consonant with the policy of 
the rule and in line with the breadth of discretion which the rule 
confers on trial judges. 
3. Rule 11 
The propriety of a discovery certification procedure is also 
supported in some measure by Rule 11, which deals with the 
signing of pleadings. The rule states that "[tlhe signature of an 
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the 
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and 
belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not inter- 
posed for delay."lw The rule further provides that a pleading 
signed with the intent to defeat the purpose of the rule may be 
stricken as sham and false, and in the event that the violation was 
willful, the attorney filing the pleading may be subjected to ap- 
propriate disciplinary action. lol 
Because the rule does away with the requirement of verified 
pleadings "[elxcept when otherwise specifically provided by rule 
or statute,"lo2 the argument might be raised that Rule 11 cuts 
against the legitimacy of a certification procedure, a t  least to the 
extent that  certification is equivalent to verification that the 
complaint was filed in good faith. However, the elimination of the 
verification requirement was merely designed to do away with 
"the all too barren formality of an oath to pleadings;"lo3 it was 
certainly not intended to relieve counsel of their obligation of 
good faith and avoidance of delay.lo4 
Rule 11 sanctions have been invoked to deal with abuses very 
much like those the certification procedure is designed to handle. 
In Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Federal Savings & Loan 
Association, lo5 a group of mortgage borrowers filed actions against 
100. FED. R. CN. P. 11. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. Verification is specifically required by Rule 23.1 (derivative actions brought 
by a shareholder); Rule 27(a) (petition for the perpetuation of testimony before com- 
mencement of an action); Rule 65(b) (ex parte request for a temporary restraining order); 
and Rule 66 (proceedings for the appointment of the receiver impliedly require verification 
since verification was a standard feature of prior practice referred to by the rule). Among 
the major federal statutes requiring verification are the following: 8 U.S.C. § 1445(a) 
(1976) (petition for naturalization); 11 U.S.C. 8 41(c) (1976) (petitions for voluntary and 
involuntary bankruptcies); 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1970) (removal of actions from state court); 
28 U.S.C. 8 1734(b) (1970) (replacement of lost or destroyed court records); 28 U.S.C. § 
1915 (1970) (proceedings in forma pauperis); 28 U.S.C. 5 1924 (1970) (verification of bill 
of costs); and 28 U.S.C. 8 2242 (1970) (application for writ of habeas corpus). 
103. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 463 (1942). 
104. See id. 
105. 365 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
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some 177 mortgage-lending institutions. They alleged, inter alia, 
that the defendant institutions had conspired to eliminate inter- 
, est on escrow accounts employed to collect tax and utility fees, 
and thereby reduce competition in the market for borrowers. The 
plaintiffs' attorneys had simply gone through the Philadelphia 
phone book and sued every individual or lending institution listed 
that might possibly use such accounts.108 More than one-fourth of 
these defendants were subsequently dismissed from the case be- 
cause they did not even practice the escrow method of collecting 
such fees. Through their dragnet approach the plaintiffs' attor- 
neys imposed indiscriminate inconvenience, expense, and possi- 
ble anxiety upon a large number of innocent parties, in effect 
imposing upon them the costs of winnowing out the groundless 
claims. 
The Kinee court noted that when the plaintiffs' attorneys 
signed their pleading, they had no reasonable basis to believe that 
the allegations therein were true as to each defendant. At best, 
they were aware that within the aggregate mass of defendants 
sued some defendants were possibly guilty of the alleged viola- 
tions. The court held that this was an abuse of process and a 
violation of Rule 11 .Io7 Since the pleadings asserted potentially 
good claims against the defendants remaining in the action, the 
court held that it would be inappropriate to apply the sanction 
of striking the pleading as a sham. Instead, the court notified the 
attorneys for the dismissed defendants that they could file a bill 
of costs for their clients' expenses to be taxed to the plaintiffs' 
attorneys. Io8 
While differing in some respects from discovery certification, 
the procedure applied in Kinee is certainly suggestive of the legit- 
imacy of the certification technique. Kinee recognized the prob- 
lem of potential pretrial abuses whereby plaintiffs unfairly im- 
pose the costs of gathering information on innocent defendants 
without exerting any effort to determine whether there is good 
ground for the claim asserted. In dealing with this abuse, the 
court imposed a sanction that was not specifically provided for 
under the rules, but one that was well tailored to rectify the 
unfairness of imposing fact-gathering costs on innocent parties. 
The authority of a court to strike a pleading signed in viola- 
tion of Rule 11 or to impose alternative sanctions is well estab- 
106. Id. at 982. 
107. Id. at 982-83. 
108. Id. at 983. 
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lished,log although these measures are seldom invoked.l1° Plead- 
ings have been stricken in an action where it was clear that the 
named plaintiff was essentially recruited by the attorney and 
knew little or nothing of the nature of the claim.lll This suggests 
the significance of a plaintiff's informational basis for his allega- 
tions, albeit from a slightly different angle. Another court, after 
noting a litigant's obligation under Rule 11 to certify that there 
is good ground for a claim, has stressed the significance of par- 
ticularization of issues to the management of protracted litiga- 
tion.l12 Thus, to the extent certification is a means whereby a 
court can determine during early stages of litigation whether a 
pleading is merely a sham properly dismissible under Rule 11, 
certification in appropriate cases would appear to be a reasonable 
exercise of a court's authority to monitor the good faith of the 
parties and decide whether there are good grounds113 for particu- 
lar allegations in a complaint. 
4. Rule 26 
In many ways, the certification procedure is closely analo- 
gous to Rule 26(c) which provides that "for good cause shown, the 
court . . . may make any order which justice requires to protect 
a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 
undue burden or expense" in the discovery process.l14 A similar 
provision was originally part of Rule 3O(b), but was' made applica- 
ble to all discovery as part of the 1970 amendments. In addition 
to creating Rule 26(c), the changes included a clarification explic- 
itly granting the court power to protect parties and witnesses 
against "undue burden or expense."l15 The rule enumerates eight 
types of orders that the court might choose in appropriate circum- 
stances, including an order "that the discovery may be had only 
on specified terms and conditions."116 Moreover, this list is not 
exhaustive. I t  certainly does not preclude the court from using 
109. See, e.g., Freeman v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Risinger, Honesty 
in Pleading and I'ts Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 34-37 (1976). 
110. Risinger, supra note 109, at 34-37. 
111. Freeman v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 395, 397-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
112. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Summit Constr. Co., 422 F.2d 242, 271 (8th Cir. 1969) 
(dictum). 
113. For an excellent discussion of what constitutes "good grounds" under Rule 11, 
see Risinger, supra note 109, at 52-61. 
114. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
115. Advisory Comm. Note, 48 F.R.D. 505 (1970). 
116. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(2). 
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mechanisms such as certification to the extent that they promote 
the policy behind the rule. Rule 26(c) thus reinforces the notion 
that the trial court has complete control over the discovery pro- 
cess and has very broad discretion to impose such restrictions or 
conditions as it deems necessary for the management of a particu- 
lar case.l17 
The courts, in exercising this discretion, have been particu- 
larly conscious of the need to impose limitations on discovery in 
complex litigation, "where the possibility of abuse is always pres- 
ent."llR The discovery rules require that a judge strike a balance 
between permitting a full inquiry through liberal discovery and 
protecting against its possible "harmful side effects."l19 In deter- 
mining what is unduly burdensome the court must take into ac- 
count the individual circumstances of the action before it. 
"[Elven very slight inconvenience may be unreasonable if there 
is no occasion for the inquiry and it cannot benefit the party 
making it?" Certification could serve a particularly valuable 
role in identifying those situations in which a claim is so lacking 
in foundation that it would be unreasonable to allow discovery to 
go forward at all. 
Certification can thus be viewed as an extension of the reme- 
dies available to a court under Rule 26(c). But, while certification 
is designed to fulfill the same basic purposes as Rule 26(c) reme- 
dies, it is intended to be exercised primarily in cases sufficiently 
complex to create a significant risk of discovery abuse and a t  a 
stage in the proceedings earlier than that at  which Rule 26(c) 
normally comes into play. Certification differs from Rule 26(c) 
remedies in other significant respects. In contrast to certification, 
Rule 26(c) is structured to allow challenges only after unduly 
burdensome discovery has been sought by an opposing party. The 
courts have reinforced this anangement,121 noting that the parties 
117. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, 8 2036, at 267-68 (1970). See also Paramount 
Film Distrib. Corp. v. Civic Center Theatre, Inc., 333 F.2d 358, 362 (10th Cir. 1964). 
118. Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 661, 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). See also United 
States v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 268 F. Supp. 769,774 (D.N.J. 1966). But see Wald- 
ron v. Cities Serv. Co., 361 F.2d 671, 673 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd sub nom. First Nat'l Bank 
v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968) (discovery proceeded over a period of nine years 
before the court decided that plaintiff had had "more than ample opportunities" to find 
evidence of his claim filed on a "hunch or suspicion"). 
119. 4 MOORE, supra note 68, 1[ 26.67, at 26-487 (2d ed. 1976). 
120. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, 8 2036, at 270 (1970) (footnote omitted). See 
also Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 4 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 487, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); 
United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213, 219 n.9 (D. Del. 1960) ("discovery 
has limits and . . . these limits grow more formidable as the showing of need decreases"). 
121. Neonex Int'l Ltd. v. Norris Grain Co., 338 F. Supp. 845, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
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should proceed on their own and seek court intervention "only 
where bad faith, annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or the 
like are the purpose of the examination, or other special circum- 
stances This structural difference between certification 
and Rule 26(c) has particular significance with regard to the 
problem of equalizing the startup burdens of plaintiffs and defen- 
dants in complex antitrust litigation. Whereas the burden of 
showing that a discovery request is unreasonable under Rule 26 
lies with the party against whom discovery is sought,ln the bur- 
den of establishing the requisite threshold information for certifi- 
cation lies with the party seeking discovery. Finally, Rule 26(c) 
has simply not been applied in a manner that would allow its 
remedies to serve as functional equivalents for certification.12' 
Even Rule 26(c) (2), which parallels the certification notion most 
closely in that it allows a court to limit the "terms and condi- 
tions" upon which discovery may be granted, has generally been 
applied merely to impose conditions related to the convenience 
of the parties in terms of time and place,lu and has not been used 
to establish threshold informational requirements as a prerequi- 
site for further discovery. 
In summary, Rule 26(c) provides authority by analogy for 
certification, but the two remedies are distinct enough that Rule 
26(c) could probably not be made to serve as an adequate substi- 
tute for certification in those unusually complex and nebulous 
cases where certification would be most salutary. Of course, once 
an adequate certificate is filed with the court in response to a 
certification order, discovery would proceed along its normal 
course and the panoply of sanctions and remedies established by 
the Federal Rules would come into play. 
B. Rule 83 and the Decisionmaking Power of the Court 
One of the clearest sources of authority for a discovery certifi- 
cation rule is found in Rule 83, which provides: 
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges 
thereof may from time to time make and amend rules governing 
122. Laverett v. Continental Briar Pipe Co., 25 F. Supp. 80, 82 (E.D.N.Y. 1938). 
123. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
124. As a practical matter, Rule 26(c) is infrequently used. See 1978 PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS, supra note 6, at 35. 
125. See 4 MOORE, supra note 68, 1 26.70 (2d ed. 1976); 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra 
note 58, $ 2038 (1970). The concern with time and place convenience extends to those 
conditions which impose expense reimbursement requirements. See 4 MOORE, supra note 
68, fl 26.77 (2d ed. 1976). 
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its practice not inconsistent with these rules. Copies of rules and 
amendments so made by any district court shall upon their 
promulgation be furnished to the Supreme Court of the United 
States. In all cases not provided for by rule, the district courts 
may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with 
these r~1es . l~~  
The rule establishes two independent powers that courts may 
invoke to fill procedural gaps within the federal system. These 
two powers have been appropriately characterized as a rulemak- 
ing power and a decisionmaking power.ln 
The drafters of the Federal Rules were very conscious of the 
fact that they were creating two distinct powers under Rule 83. 
They anticipated that the rulemaking power would be used rather 
infrequently, and that it would be applied primarily to fill delib- 
erate gaps left in the civil rules to accommodate recognized local 
needs.128 It was not expected that rulemaking would be applied 
to sensitive issues of nationwide i r n ~ 0 r t . l ~ ~  In contrast to the lim- 
ited role envisioned for the rulemaking power, the drafters ex- 
pected much greater reliance to be placed on the decisionmaking 
power.lsO Unlike the language creating the rulemaking power, 
which was derived from various pre-1938 statutes,lsl the language 
establishing the decisionmaking power was new with the federal 
rules.ls2 Significantly, the drafters regarded it as one of the most 
important additions in the new r ~ 1 e s . l ~ ~  They were apparently 
126. FED. R. CIV. P. 83. 
127. Note, Bule 83 and the Local Federal Rules, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (1967) 
[hereinafter cited as Local Federal Rules]. 
128. 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, § 3152, a t  218 (1973); Local Federal Rules, 
supra note 127, at 1253. 
129. 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, 4 3152, a t  220 (1973). 
130. Local Federal Rules, supra note 127, a t  1253. 
131. The language of the first sentence of Rule 83 traces its ancestry ultimately to 
the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 8 17, 1 Stat. 83. See Local Federal Rules, supra note 
127, at 1253 & n.9. It  was closely modeled upon two earlier grants of rulemaking power-a 
predecessor of the current 28 U.S.C. 8 2071 (1970) and Equity Rule 79,226 U.S. 673 (1912). 
See Local Federal Rules, supra note 127, a t  1253-54 & nn.10-11. 
132. Local Federal Rules, supra note 127, a t  1254. 
133. Commenting on this new power, a member of the Advisory Committee stated 
that this provision is 
"one of the most important and salutary in the entire set of rules. It  closes all 
gaps in the rules. It puts an end to the whole of the Conformity Act, and it  
permits judges to decide the unusual or minor procedural problems that arise 
in any system of jurisprudence in the light of the circumstances that surround 
them and of the justice of the case without the complications and injustice that 
must attend attempts to forecast the situations and to regulate them in advance 
either by general or by local rule." 
12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, 1 3155, a t  242-43 (1973) (quoting Proceedings, Wash- 
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impressed by the potential for procedural flexibility afforded by 
this rule's allowance of case-by-case handling of unique or unfore- 
seen problems. Within the overall system of uniformity contem- 
plated by the new Federal Rules, Rule 83 was to serve the vital 
function of allocating to the good sense and sound discretion of 
district judges the responsibility of dealing with those situations 
which prospective rules could not adequately handle. Therefore, 
the decisionmaking power was theoretically supposed to play a 
much more significant role than the making of local rules. In 
practice, the tendency has been somewhat the opposite.134 Dis- 
trict courts have adopted a plethora of local rules,135 whereas the 
decisionmaking power remains little known and little used.136 
The discovery certification procedure can very easily be con- 
ceived of as a procedural mechanism properly deriving from a 
court's decisionmaking power under Rule 83. It is not a procedure 
which should be invoked as a matter of course, even in identifia- 
ble situations such as the large antitrust case. Rather, it is a 
device which is available when circumstances warrant reducing 
or eliminating the risk of discovery abuse. Thus, it is necessarily 
a creature of judicial discretion and one which must be invoked 
on a case-by-case basis.13' The question therefore becomes 
whether the limitations circumscribing the scope of Rule 83 pre- 
vent the rule from serving as the basis for the discovery certifica- 
tion device. 
Before proceeding to a discussion of this question, a meth- 
odological point must be made. Because most of the case law and 
scholarly analysis which has examined the scope of Rule 83 fo- 
cuses on the rulemaking power, analysis of the boundaries of the 
decisionmaking power must necessarily rely upon analogies 
ington Institute on the Federal Rules 129 (1938) (statement of Edgar Tolman)). He further 
noted that overuse of the rulemaking power would tend to impair the usefulness of the 
final sentence of Rule 83. Id. This statement does not indicate how "unusual or minor" 
procedural problems must be before they qualify as fit subjects for the exercise of decision- 
making power, and therefore the statement does not shed much light on the scope of Rule 
83. However, it does underscore the significance that the drafters attached to this provi- 
sion. 
134. 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, 8 3155, a t  243 (1973). 
135. Comment, The Local Rules of Civil Procedure in the Federal District Courts-A 
Survey, 1966 DUKE L.J. 1011, 1012 [hereinafter cited as Local Rules Survey]. 
136. Local Federal Rules, supra note 127, a t  1265. 
137. Because of the inherently discretionary nature of the certification device, it may 
be preferable to avoid formalizing it through rulemaking at  the local or national level. 
Such rulemaking would more adequately apprise parties of the availability of the proce- 
dure, but (particularly if it went beyond merely specifying the nature of the procedure 
and the factors which should guide judicial discretion in deciding to invoke it) would 
inevitably destroy some of the flexibility which is one of the key assets of certification. 
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drawn from restrictions on local rulemaking. While some of the 
limitations developed for rulemaking may be inapplicable in the 
decisionmaking context, they provide the only available clues to 
the contours of Rule 83. 
The chief limitation on the scope of Rule 83 power is that it 
may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with the Federal 
R ~ 1 e s . l ~ ~  Broadly speaking, judicial action under Rule 83 can be 
"inconsistent" either in the strong sense of running flatly counter 
to the provisions of the rules, or in the weak sense of constituting 
an independent procedural norm or device in a field totally occu- 
pied by the Federal Rules. Since it is easiest to make the argu- 
ment that certification is inconsistent with the rules in the weak 
sense (certification is obviously a novel device which operates on 
terrain arguably covered by the rules), we will first consider 
whether inconsistency in this sense is sufficient to make Rule 83 
unavailable as a basis for certification. 
At the outset, it must be acknowledged that there is consid- 
erable authority for the proposition that Rule 83 should not be 
invoked in those areas already covered by other Federal Rules. In 
Hughes Brothers v. Callanan Road Improvement Co., 139 for exam- 
ple, the court recognized its authority under Rule 83 to regulate 
situations not provided for by the rules. However, it  declined to 
use that authority to compel production of a person for the taking 
of a deposition on the ground that the party seeking discovery 
could invoke the sanctions of Rule 37(d) and thus the situation 
was already covered by the rules.140 Similarly, many of the criti- 
cisms that have been leveled against the proliferation of local 
rules,l4I particularly those rules directed a t  predetermining the 
138. This limitation is expressly made applicable both to the rulemaking and deci- 
sionmaking aspects of Rule 83. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83. 
It is also understood that rulemaking and decisionmaking under Rule 83 is invalid if 
inconsistent with the Constitution or with an act of Congress. See Johnson v. Manhattan 
Ry., 289 U.S. 479,503 (1933); Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore & Phila- 
delphia Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. 629,635-36 (1924); Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241,244 
(5th Cir. 1968); 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, § 3153, at 228 & n.54 (1973). It  is 
difficult to imagine any statutory or constitutional norms which would be violated by a 
district judge's decision to demand certification before allowing discovery to go forward. 
It might be argued that implicit in congressional creation of the antitrust laws is a man- 
date that courts should not impede recovery on legitimate claims by interposing proce- 
dural obstacles, and that certification is thus inconsistent with the antitrust laws. By the 
same token, however, Congress did not intend that the courts should be unduly permissive 
in granting access to that remedy. And, in any event, certification does not ultimately 
preclude a good faith claim. 
139. 41 F.R.D. 450, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
140. Id. a t  452-53. 
141. 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, § 3152, a t  223 (1973); Local Federal Rules, 
supra note 127, a t  1259; Local Rules Survey, supra note 135, at 1012. 
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outcome of recurrent discovery disputes,142 are in substance argu- 
ments that such local rulemaking is inconsistent in the weak 
sense with the overall structure of the Federal Rules. The notion 
is that the burgeoning number of local rules impairs the symme- 
try and flexibility of the federal system, encroaches upon areas 
that were wisely left to sound judicial discretion under the rules, 
and in general clutters the field within which the Federal Rules 
were to operate unimpeded. 
While weak inconsistency sets limits on the exercise of Rule 
83 power, there is good reason to believe it does not bar a certifica- 
tion procedure based upon Rule 83. There are many situations in 
which local rulemaking power has been exercised in areas covered 
by the Federal Rules in ways that enhance the overall operation 
of the federal procedural system. For example, local court rules 
have been used in the discovery area to maximize the extent to 
which the parties exercise private control of the discovery process. 
One widely adopted rule requires that counsel confer in good faith 
to resolve discovery disputes before a discovery motion will be 
heard.143 Properly invoked, the certification procedure would have 
an analogous kind of ameliorative impact on the federal system. 
Rule 83 has also been recognized as a basis for interstitial 
judicial actions which are arguably inconsistent with federal pro- 
cedure in the weak sense by virtue of their proximity to matters 
specifically covered by particular rules, but which are important 
if various contingencies left open by the rules are to be properly 
handled. Thus, although Federal Rule 41(b) specifically covers 
the issue of dismissal for want of prosecution and indicates that 
it shall be allowed only upon the defendant's motion, it is well 
settled tha t  a district court does not ac t  in a manner 
"inconsistent with . . . [the] Rules" in dismissing sua sponte an 
action for lack of prosecution.144 There are numerous examples in 
which courts have sustained the exercise of Rule 83 power in areas 
covered by other federal rules,145 and there is no reason to believe 
that the weak inconsistency obstacle could not be surmounted by 
the certification procedure as well. 
142. See 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, $3154, at 237-38 (1973); Local Federal 
Rules, supra note 127, at 1261-62. 
143. See United States v. Carter Prods., Inc., 28 F.R.D. 373, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); 
Local Rules Survey, supra note 135, at 1048. See also 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 
58, § 3154, at 237 (1973). 
144. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962); Darlington v. Studebaker- 
Packard Corp., 261 F.2d 903, 905 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 992 (1959); Hicks v. 
Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 115 F.2d 406, 408-09 (9th Cir. 1940). 
145. See generally Local Rules Survey, supra note 135. 
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At a more general level, it is significant that the principal 
arguments against judicial action that constitutes weak inconsis- 
tency all seem to be leveled a t  problems peculiar to exercise of 
the rulemaking power. The objections indicate a variety of con- 
cerns: that the flood of local rules tends to destroy the symmetry 
of the federal system, that out-of-district lawyers may be easily 
trapped by local procedural  complication^,^^^ that some local 
rules are adopted without sufficiently careful consideration,14' or 
that litigation is forced into procrustean molds without adequate 
sensitivity to the demands of individual cases.148 But whatever 
force these objections may have in narrowing the scope of rule- 
making power under Rule 83, they are inapplicable to decision- 
making power in general, and to the exercise of decisionmaking 
power to invoke a discovery certification procedure in particular. 
To allow a judge to demand certification in an appropriate case 
does not permanently introduce a formalistic rule into the proce- 
dure of a particular district; it simply gives added flexibility to 
the manner in which a court can efficaciously and judiciously 
supervise discovery in particular cases to avoid abuse. 
A slightly different type of limitation on the exercise of Rule 
83 power invalidates a local rule if it introduces basic procedural 
innovations that  are so sweeping in scope that they should 
properly be left to the rulemaking power of the Supreme Court. 
While this notion has been articulated as a separate ground of 
invalidity, it can be thought of as a special instance of weak 
inconsistency since it precludes changes that, though logically 
consistent with the rules, amount to structural alteration of the 
extant procedural terrain. This limitation on Rule 83 was enunci- 
ated by the Supreme Court in Miner v. Atlass. ld9 There the issue 
was whether district courts could authorize the taking of discov- 
ery depositions by local rule pursuant to Admiralty Rule 44, 
which was virtually identical to Federal Rule 83.150 After rejecting 
the contention that district courts may never pass local rules in 
areas already dealt with in part by existing rules,151 the Court 
146. 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, 4 3152, at 219, 223 (1973). 
147. See J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 133-34; 12 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, 4 3152, at 220 (1973). 
148. See sources cited note 142 supra. 
149. 363 U.S .  641 (1960). 
150. Admiralty Rule 44 provided: 
In suits in admiralty in all cases not provided for by these rules or by statute, 
the district courts are to regulate their practice in such a manner as they deem 
most expedient for the due administration of justice, provided the same are not 
inconsistent with these rules. 
151. 363 U.S. at 648-50. The Court stated: "[Tlhis Court's rules of admiralty prac- 
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concluded that the exercise of rulemaking authority under the 
particular circumstances was improper because such "basic pro- 
cedural innovations [should] be introduced only after mature 
consideration of informed opinion from all relevant quarters, with 
all the opportunities for comprehensive and integrated treatment 
which such consideration affords."152 
In analyzing the nature of the limits thus imposed on local 
rulemaking power, it is vital to understand just how radical the 
innovation in Miner was. The taking of depositions, for discovery 
purposes only, was a practice foreign to admiralty procedure and 
had in fact been one of the most significant changes introduced 
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the Court 
was extremely reluctant to allow such a major change to be made 
solely through local rulemaking. This was reinforced by the fact 
that admiralty has always been a field of federal jurisdiction in 
which "nationwide uniformity has . . . been highly esteemed."lS 
The discovery certification procedure would be a substantially 
less radical departure from existing practice under the rules than 
was the authorization of discovery depositions in admiralty. Ar- 
guably, the procedure represents a less significant departure from 
prior practice than some other innovations which the Miner Court 
found permissibleP4 The discovery certification procedure is sim- 
ply a technique which can be used within the context of the 
existing rules to assist a court in managing the discovery process 
and preventing abuse. 
Turning to the question of inconsistency in the strong sense, 
a persuasive argument can be made that the certification proce- 
dure violates neither the spirit nor the letter of the Federal Rules. 
To avoid the problems of "strong" inconsistency, the certification 
procedure must comport with the notion of Rule 8 notice pleading 
and be consonant with the generally liberal discovery policies of 
the rules. 155 
tice for the District Courts are not comprehensive codes regulating every detail of practice, 
and we would be slow to hold that the interstices may not be the subject of appropriate 
local regulation." Id. at 648. The Court then cataloged some examples of permissible local 
rulemaking. Id. at 649; see, e.g., note 154 infra. 
152. Id. at 650. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. a t  649 (local rule allowing a court to enter judgment on the uncontested 
portion of a claim prior to trial on the disputed issues described as an allowable exercise 
of Rule 83 power). , 
155. One could conceivably argue that a certification order is in effect an order to 
submit a more particularized pleading, that it is thus a procedural device operating in a 
field already regulated by Rule 8, and that it is therefore an instance of inconsistency in 
the weak sense. Such an argument, however, reflects a misunderstanding of the distinction 
between strong and weak inconsistency. Strong inconsistency will necessarily involve 
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There are essentially two grounds for thinking that Rule 8 
and certification may be inconsistent. The first is that insistence 
on certification appears to circumvent Rule 8's disavowal of parti- 
cularized pleadings. By requiring some factual specificity during 
the early phase of litigation, certification appears to run directly 
counter to the lax standards of notice pleading, and thereby to 
collide with the mandate implicit in the Federal Rules that once 
a pleading has met those standards, further factual elaboration 
is to be obtained through discovery.lM The second possible ground 
for inconsistency derives from the fact that Rule 8 must be read 
in conjunction with Rule 12(e), which allows a party to bring a 
motion for a more definite statement. Originally, Rule 12(e) au- 
thorized a motion for a bill of particulars, but this provision was 
deleted by an amendment in 1948. Certification might be objec- 
tionable, then, because it appears to reintroduce the old bill of 
particulars that was expressly eliminated from the Federal Rules. 
These potential sources of inconsistency will be discussed in 
order. 
Rule 8 provides that pleadings need only contain "a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief ';I5' that "[nlo technical forms of pleading . . . 
are required";158 and that "[all1 pleadings shall be so construed 
as to do substantial justice."15g I t  was designed to " 'discourage 
battles over mere form of statement and to sweep away the need- 
less controversies which the codes permitted that served either to 
delay trial on the merits or to prevent a party from having a trial 
because of mistakes in statement.' "lBO Numerous decisions have 
held that it is inappropriate to require higher standards for plead- 
ings in special types of cases, including antitrust cases.lB1 
procedural innovation in an area already covered by the rules but, unlike weak inconsis- 
tency, it involves not merely adding a new norm or device to the rules, but adding some- 
thing that is contrary to their explicit or implicit mandate. Moreover, while there is some 
analogy between a discovery certificate and a particularized pleading, i t  is more concep- 
tually useful to think of the certificate as a procedural device intermediate between plead- 
ing and discovery but distinct from both. See notes 58-59 and accompanying text supra. 
156. See Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 322-23 (2d Cir. 1957) (Clark, C.J.); 
Package Closure Corp. v. Sealright Co., 141 F.2d 972, 978-79 (2d Cir. 1944). 
157. FED. R. CN. P. 8(a)(2). 
158. FED. R. CN. P. 8(e)(l). 
159. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(f). 
160. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, § 1201, a t  58 n.11 (1969) (quoting Advisory 
Committee's 1955 Report, Note on Rule 8(a)(2)). 
161. George C. Frey Ready-Mixed Concrete, Inc. v. Pine Hill Concrete Mix Corp., 
554 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir. 1977); Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466, 
472 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977); Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. 
v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1089-90 
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In order to see why these considerations do not preclude bas- 
ing a certification procedure on Rule 83, a number of points must 
be made. At the outset, it must be remembered that a discovery 
certificate is not merely a kind of particularized pleading, but 
rather, a hybrid procedure intermediate between pleading and 
discovery.lm A number of consequences flow from the recognition 
of the intermediate status of the certification procedure. At the 
very least, this recognition makes it clear that certification is not 
the type of technical pleading done away with by Rule 8(e)(l). 
More importantly, it emphasizes that the certification process is 
not concerned with the "mere form of statement."163 Certification 
is essentially a holding measure that will ultimately "prevent a 
party from having a trial"lU only if the party is utterly unable to 
provide information from which a judge could reasonably infer 
that there is good ground to allow discovery to go forward. Unlike 
the special pleading practices Rule 8 was designed to eliminate, 
certification does not create the risk that a party's claim may be 
lost as a result of a technical misstep in verbal jousting. And 
whereas experience with special pleading rules showed that they 
tended to interpose delays without yielding any compensating 
informational gains,16 certification is as likely to hasten as to 
delay trial on the merits. While it may postpone the onset of 
discovery, it compels sharper formulation of the issues and 
thereby expedites handling of the particular case once the certifi- 
cate is submitted. Moreover, it creates systemwide incentives for 
better and earlier focusing of issues that should result in a net 
efficiency gain for the entire system. 
In addition to recognizing that the certification procedure is 
distinguishable in significant ways from antiquated "special 
pleadings," it is important to remember that some degree of fac- 
-- - 
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977); Control Data Corp. v. IBM, 421 F.2d 
323, 326 (8th Cir. 1970); New Home Appliance Center, Inc. v. Thompson, 250 F.2d 881, 
883 (10th Cir. 1957); Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 322-24 (2d Cir. 1957); Broyer 
v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 415 F. Supp. 193, 194 (E.D. Pa. 1976); see Clark, Special Pleading 
in the "Big Case", 21 F.R.D. 45,48 (1957). Cf. Fulton Co. v. Beaird-Poulan, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 
604, 609 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (antitrust action complaint must state a claim for relief with 
clarity but need not set forth a detailed history of the parties' relations or include details 
of an evidentiary nature, conclusory allegations, or analogous references); Karlinsky v. 
New York Racing Ass'n, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 937, 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (in an antitrust suit 
"that involves difficult questions of fact and law, as well as public issues, i t  is absolutely 
necessary that [the action] commence with a complaint that is in fact a short, plain and 
concise statement of the material facts"). 
162. See notes 58-59 and accompanying text supra. 
163. See Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 324 (2d Cir. 1957). 
164. Id. 
165. See id. at 322-25 & n.3; Clark, supra note 161, a t  54. 
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tual specificity is required even under the liberalized pleading 
policies of Rule 8. A party is still required "to disclose adequate 
information regarding the basis of his claim for relief as distin- 
guished from a bare averment that he wants relief and is entitled 
to it?" The leading Supreme Court pronouncement on the 
pleading standard imposed by Rule 8 states that a pleading must 
give the opposing party "fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim 
is and the grounds upon which it rests."lW What constitutes "fair 
notice" may of course vary with the complexity of a case. As 
stated by the court in Kirihara u. Bendix Corp., la "in potentially 
complex cases, particularly in cases involving violations of the 
antitrust laws, the plaintiff should go beyond the 'short' require- 
ments of Rule 8 if necessary to present a 'plain,' i.e., understand- 
able and factual statement of the alleged antitrust violations."169 
A bare statement of conspiracy or injury under the antitrust laws 
without any supporting facts is insufficient.170 Viewed in this 
light, the demands of discovery certification appear to be consis- 
tent with the minimal "fair notice" requirement of Rule 8. 
The preceding considerations explain to a large extent why 
cases holding that special pleading standards should not be re- 
quired in particular fields of litigation do not imply that discovery 
certification is inconsistent with the Federal Rules. Generally, 
these cases examine the issue of the appropriateness of special 
pleading requirements in the context of a motion to dismiss.171 
Subjecting a party to a sanction this draconian for failure to 
comply with a heightened standard of pleading conjures up mem- 
ories of all the horrors of outmoded pleading practices. But certi- 
fication carries no such stigma because it is not a pleading device 
at all.172 In addition, certification is likely to advance rather than 
inhibit the resolution of disputed issues on the merits by clarify- 
166. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, § 1202, at 64 (1969). 
167. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 
168. 306 F. Supp. 72 (D. Hawaii 1969). 
169. Id. a t  76. 
170. Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 
(2d Cir. 1972). 
171. See, e.g., George C. Frey Ready-Mixed Concrete, Inc. v. Pine Hill Concrete Mix 
Corp., 554 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1977); Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466 
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977); Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San 
Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977); New Home Appliance Center, Inc. v. Thompson, 250 
F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1957); Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957); Broyer v. 
B.F. Goodrich Co., 415 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Fulton Co. v. Beaird-Poulan, Inc., 
54 F.R.D. 604 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Karlinsky v. New York Racing Ass'n, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 
937 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
172. See notes 58-59 and accompanying text supra. 
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ing what those issues are. Furthermore, a certification order's 
demand for more particularized information should not be con- 
ceived of as creating de facto a heightened standard of specificity 
in factual allegations. Rather, it should be understood as a recog- 
nition that the uniform standard of fair notice may demand 
greater specificity in an unusually complex case than in conven- 
tional litigation. 
The second possible source of inconsistency stems from the 
seeming similarity of certification with the long-since jettisoned 
motion for a bill of particulars under Rule 12(e). Prior to 1948, 
Rule 12(e) allowed such a motion to be addressed to any matter 
that was not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity 
to enable the moving party to draft a responsive pleading or pre- 
pare for trial.173 This portion of Rule 12(e) was dropped after it 
became apparent that the availability of this motion created 
needless uncertainty as to the standard of "plainness" required 
by Rule 8. Additionally, a bill of particulars was not as effective 
a means of compelling disclosure of evidence as di~c0very.l~~ 
While both certification and the former motion for a bill of par- 
ticulars demand that a party who has filed a nebulous complaint 
provide additional information to assist the opposing party in 
comprehending the nature of the claim lodged against him, the 
two procedures are distinguishable in important respects. Certifi- 
cation is available in a much narrower range of cases than the old 
bill of particulars. Whereas a bill could be requested whenever a 
matter was not averred with sufficient definiteness or particular- 
ity, certification is proper in only a limited number of complex 
cases where substantial risks of discovery abuse justify the impo- 
sition of some restraints. Thus, the kind of systemwide uncer- 
tainty as to when a pleading was sufficiently definite to withstand 
a motion for a bill of par t ic~ la rs l~~  is unlikely to result from certifi- 
cation. For a similar reason, the decision to order certification has 
a rather different focus than the decision to require a bill of par- 
ticulars. In the latter, the emphasis is on eliciting facts that will 
clarify the nature of the dispute; whereas in the former, the focus 
is on determining the existence of a genuine dispute before allow- 
ing the process of discovery to go forward. This difference is im- 
portant because it reduces the likelihood that claims will be dis- 
missed on grounds unrelated to the merits (i.e., nuisance value 
-- 
173. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, § 1203, at 67 (1969). 
174. See id. at 67-70. 
175. See id. at 67-68. 
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settlements). Furthermore, because the Rule 12(e) motion for a 
bill of particulars examined the sufficiency of a pleading in the 
context of a motion to dismiss, the granting of such motions inev- 
itably created greater tensions with Rule 8 than the issuance of a 
certification order. In sum, because of the pliability of the certifi- 
cation device, it is capable of fulfilling the particularizing aims 
of the old Rule 12(e) device without creating the problems that 
led to its demise. 
Since certification's strong inconsistency with modern plead- 
ing rules is more apparent than real, the only remaining question 
is its possible inconsistency with the liberality of the discovery 
rules. No one would maintain that the discovery rules are to be 
construed with such liberality that they create a license to impose 
unlimited factfinding expenditures on an adversary. The rules 
themselves provide for protective orders and similar devices de- 
signed to prevent such abuses.17' certification is merely a tech- 
nique a court can use to prevent the unjustifiable imposition of 
analogous costs at a stage in litigation too early for normal discov- 
ery remedies to come into play. Thus, far from being inconsistent 
with liberal discovery policies, certification would help to fine- 
tune the balance already inherent in the Federal Rules between 
open access to information and fairness in allocating discovery 
burdens. Moreover, it must be remembered that the certification 
procedure will not permanently forestall discovery so long as the 
plaintiff is in a position to meet the minimal informational 
threshold of the certification requirement. 
There thus appear to be good grounds to believe that certifi- 
cation is not inconsistent in the strong sense with the liberality 
of the discovery rules. This is particularly true in light of the 
emerging tendency for judges to take a tougher stand in adminis- 
tering discovery to prevent abuses.177 Far from being inconsistent 
with the discovery scheme of the Federal Rules, the discovery 
certification device, if used sensitively, can enhance the fairness 
of the overall discovery system. It  can ease the process of clarify- 
ing issues in complex cases, thereby facilitating the management 
of the discovery process and encouraging resolution of disputes on 
the merits. It is a procedural device substantially less harsh in its 
effect than many of the rules or decisions that have been laid 
176. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). See also notes 114-25 and accompanying text 
supra. 
177. Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery 
Sanctions, 91 HAW. L. REV. 1033, 1044-45 (1978). See also SCM Societa Commerciale 
S.P.A. v. Industrial & Commercial Research Corp., 72 F.R.D. 110, 112 (N.D. Tex. 1976). 
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down pursuant to Rule 83,1T8 and constitutes an arguably less 
significant divergence from the overall federal rule system than 
many other changes made pursuant to Rule 83 that have been 
s ~ s t a i n e d . ~ ~ ~ u l e  83, th n, constitutes another basis upon which 
a district court could issue a certification order. 
C. The Inherent Power of a Court to Control the Proceedings 
Before It 
Even if there were not a sufficient basis for certification in 
the Federal Rules, there is strong reason to conclude that a court 
would be authorized to invoke such a procedure in appropriate 
cases by the use of its inherent power over its processes.180 It has 
been understood for centuries that once a court is vested with 
jurisdiction, it necessarily acquires "judicial power commensur- 
ate with the jurisdiction conferred."181 All courts, federal and 
state, have a broad and inherent power "over their own process, 
to prevent abuse, oppression and injustice."182 This power is "as 
extensive and efficient as may be required by the necessity for 
. . . [its] exercise,"183 and embraces a court's jurisdiction to con- 
trol its proceedings and the persons who come before it or affect 
its dealings.184 This power is typically referred to as "inherent 
178. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962) (involuntary dismissal for 
failure of counsel to appear a t  a pretrial conference). 
179. See Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, Ministry of Commerce, 360 
F.2d 103,107-10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966) (providing a method for service 
on a foreign government); Hare v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 342 F. Supp. 678, 686 
(D. Md. 1972) (Rule 83 invoked to justify court order requiring amendment of a complaint 
that failed to use separate counts as required by Rule 10(b)). Despite Rule 83's proscrip- 
tion of local rules inconsistent with the Federal Rules, there are many local rules in force 
which appear to be in direct conflict with the general rules. The clearest examples are 
found in the rules of the First Circuit, adopted pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 47, which parallels Rule 83. Several of those circuit rules state that the local 
rule is to be followed "notwithstanding the provisions of" specified Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. E.g., l s ~  CIR. R. 8, 11(c). See 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, 
8 3152, a t  219 & n.21 (1973). Many of these rules remain in force merely because counsel 
are reluctant to challenge them and it would seldom be the case that their application 
would result in reversible error. Id. a t  219; Local Federal Rules, supra note 127, a t  1263- 
64. 
180. The Mountain View court relied upon the inherent power notion as one basis for 
its decision to issue a certification order in that case. See Mountain View Pharmacy v. 
Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 (D. Utah, Jan. 18, 1978) (judge's letter to all counsel). 
181. 1 MOORE, supra note 68, 7 .60[6], a t  633 (2d ed. 1977). 
182. Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 146 (1888); see 1 MOORE, supra note 68, 
fi .60[6], a t  634 (2d ed. 1977). 
183. Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 146 (1888). 
184. Gold, Controlling Procedural A buses: The Role of Costs and Inherent Judicial 
Authority, 9 OT~AWA L. REV. 44, 74 (1977). 
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ju r i sd ic t i~n"~~~ or "incidental jurisdiction."lM As one author has 
stated, "[ilt is an overriding, supervisory jurisdiction, enabling 
the court to do what it must to maintain itself, its dignity, and 
its powers free from abuse by those who would enlist its auspices 
for purposes inconsistent with its own institutional interests and 
goals. " 
Because discovery certification is such a new device, there is 
of course no direct precedent for employing a court's inherent 
jurisdiction in this manner. However, there are numerous situa- 
tions in which a court's inherent power has been applied to rem- 
edy abuses analogous to those which may arise in the discovery 
context. For example, it is well settled that a court has power to 
dismiss a claim shown to be fictitious, a sham,ls8 or frivolous.18g 
Similarly, it is generally understood that a court may dismiss 
vexatious litigation.lgO Of course, it is seldom clear a t  the outset 
of an antitrust action whether some or all of the claims brought 
against a particular defendant are fictitious or are brought merely 
to escalate the litigation burden faced by a defendant, thus in- 
creasing settlement leverage with what is merely a vexatious 
claim. However, if a court has inherent jurisdiction to dismiss a 
claim which is fictitious, frivolous, or vexatious, there would seem 
to be no reason why a court could not stay discovery long enough 
to allow the plaintiff to certify as to facts that would show he is 
making a good faith claim. After all, a court has inherent power 
to stay actions pending before it,lgl and there is likewise authority 
185. Id. 
186. 21 C.J.S. Courts $88 (1940). Gold, supra note 184, a t  74 n.169. Inherent jurisdic- 
tion is the 
"reserve or fund of powers, a residual source of powers, which the court may 
draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, and in particu- 
lar to insure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent improper 
vexation or oppression, and to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair 
trial between them." 
Id. at 74 (quoting Jacob, The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, 23 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 
23, 51 (1970)). 
187. Gold, supra note 184, a t  74. 
188. See, e.g., Cunha v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 34 Cal. App. 2d 383, 93 P.2d 572 
(1939) and cases cited therein. In Cunha, the case was dismissed after the plaintiff was 
given repeated opportunities to rebut affidavits filed by the defendants which refuted his 
claims. 
189. See, e.g., O'Connell v. Mason, 132 F. 245, 247 (1st Cir. 1904). 
190. Patterson v. Northern Trust Co., 286 Ill. 564,122 N.E. 55 (1919) (successive suits 
by beneficiary against trustee); Scarcia v. United States Gypsum Co., 164 Misc. 825, 1 
N.Y.S.2d 358 (1937); see Cunha v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 34 Cal. App. 2d 383, 93 P.2d 
572 (1939). 
191. Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936). 
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for the proposition that a court has jurisdiction "to control its own 
process and proceedings [so] as not to produce hardship."lg2 
Of particular relevance to the certification issue is the gen- 
eral principle that a court possesses inherent jurisdiction to stay 
or dismiss proceedings in order to control and prevent abuse of 
its orders, processes, and procedures. lM Two older cases exemplify 
the litigation in this area and have strong relevance to discovery 
abuses in the antitrust setting. Stewart v. Butlerlg4 involved an 
ejectment action brought by a purported heir who hoped to in- 
duce defendants "to buy their peace, rather than submit to vexa- 
tious and expensive litigation."lg5 The plaintiff had a history of 
bringing actions against the heirs of wealthy individuals, claim- 
ing that he was an heir and had been deprived of his inheritance. 
In Stewart, the action was dismissed when it became clear the 
plaintiff was unable to overcome charges that he had "brought 
the action in bad faith and as a mere blackmailing scheme."lW 
Houston v. City of San F r a n c i ~ c o ~ ~  dealt with settlement extor- 
tion on a grander scale. In that case, a plaintiff brought an action 
which named the city and county of San Francisco along with 
approximately 15,000 residents as defendants. The plaintiff 
claimed to be the rightful owner of a tract of land covering a large 
part of the city and county, yet he made no effort to take the case 
to court, where it would have suffered a speedy demise. Instead, 
he approached unsuspecting land owners with his claim, which 
was obviously designed to create doubt and uneasiness concern- 
ing the validity of titles, and offered to release his claim for a 
modest sum. Justice Field, in describing the facts, indicated that 
it was "notorious that . . . payment was obtained in a multitude 
of instances."1g8 Noting that this type of scheme was a blatant 
"means of extorting moneys from the rightful possessors of the 
property" and amounted to "little less than . . . r~bbery,"~~%~s-  
tice Field promptly dismissed the case. 
192. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110 (1921). 
193. Gold, supra note 184, at 76. See, e.g., Bloniarz v. Roloson, 70 Cal. 2d 143, 146, 
449 P.2d 221, 223, 74 Cal. Rptr. 285, 287 (1969); Arc Inv. Co. v. Tiffith, 164 Cal. App. 2d 
Supp. 853, 330 P.2d 305 (1958); State ex rel. Dillman v. Tedder, 123 Fla. 188, 199, 166 
So. 590, 595 (1936); Ray v. Williams, 55 Fla. 723, 724, 46 So. 158, 159 (1908); Mahaffey v. 
State, 87 Idaho 228, 232, 392 P.2d 279, 281 (1964). 
194. 27 Misc. 708, 59 N.Y.S. 573 (1899). 
195. Id. at 713, 59 N.Y.S. at 577. 
196. Id. 
197. 47 F. 337 (C.C.D. Cal. 1891) (Field, J.). 
198. Id. at 339. 
199. Id. at 340. 
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To the extent that the threat of discovery in a modern anti- 
trust action may become a form of "legalized blackmail," it 
seems clear under the above cases that a court has inherent juris- 
diction to invoke whatever procedures it deems necessary to avoid 
such abuse. The inherent jurisdiction of a court-which is the 
ultimate foundation of the contempt power,200 is arguably suffi- 
cient to justify imposition of fines on negligent attorneys,201 and 
supports the dismissal of spurious a~tions~~~-should certainly be 
broad enough to allow a district judge to require certification 
when he deems it necessary. Certification is tough enough to help 
ferret out bad faith claims before heavy discovery costs and nui- 
sance value settlements result, and yet sensitive enough to do 
so without permanently prejudicing viable claims. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE 
Having established that federal courts have ample authority 
to condition the availability of discovery on compliance with a 
certification order, it remains to analyze the factors which should 
operate to limit judicial discretion in invoking the procedure. 
Finally, we will examine the sanctions which could be invoked if 
a certification order were ignored. 
A. Limiting the Scope of Certification 
Analysis of the various possible bases of authority for discov- 
ery certification has already established that there are some 
built-in limits on the legitimate exercise of the certification de- 
vice. Primarily, these limitations derive from the fact that certifi- 
cation in certain contexts could be inconsistent with the proce- 
dural regime of the Federal Rules. As implied by the discussion 
of Rule 83, issuance of a certification order pursuant to that rule 
would generally be inappropriate except in cases where the risk 
of discovery abuse was high, since in the ordinary case it would 
impair a plaintiff's right to liberal discovery once a pleading that 
passed muster under Rule 8 had been filed.203 Similarly, a court 
would contravene the liberal amendment policy of Rule 15 if it 
conditioned grant of leave to amend on compliance with a certifi- 
200. Gold, supra note 184, at 76. 
201. See Note, Civil Procedure-Power of Federal Courts to Discipline Attorneys for 
Delay in Pre-trial Procedure, 38 NOTRE DAME LAW. 158 (1962). But see Gamble v. Pope & 
Talbot, Inc., 307 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962). 
202. See notes 188-92 and accompanying text supra. 
203. See notes 155-72 and accompanying text supra. 
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cation order in circumstances where there were no grounds for 
denial of leave.204 In general, the certification remedy should be 
available only where there is some basis in the rules for its exer- 
cise, and application of the certification procedure in contraven- 
tion of this threshold condition would constitute a clear abuse of 
discretion. 
Even after determining that the above inherent limits on 
certification power have not been exceeded, however, the judge 
must decide whether to exercise his discretion to invoke certifica- 
tion in a particular case. The central issue in this regard is 
whether the potential for discovery abuse in the case is suffi- 
ciently great to justify overriding the normal assumption that 
discovery should be allowed to proceed. As a practical matter, a 
court must decide whether plaintiff's fears that certification 
would cause needless delay and impose unfair obstacles on the 
acquisition of information exclusively in the possession of the 
defendant are outweighed by risks of settlement extortion and 
related abuses. Analysis of these considerations will help assuage 
plaintiff concerns and identify the factors that should guide judi- 
cial discretion in determining whether to require certification. 
From a plaintiff's perspective, certification appears as simply one 
more potential postponement in what is already an inevitably 
protracted proceeding. But any delay caused by certification in 
an action involving a bona fide claim can be eliminated if the 
plaintiff simply drafts a complaint with sufficient specificity to 
meet the certification challenge before it arises. Of course, if a 
nebulous claims lacks foundation, a plaintiff can hardly argue 
that he is prejudiced by delay. Moreover, a plaintiff cannot very 
well maintain that expenditure of effort on its part to pinpoint 
each party's involvement constitutes an undue burden when 
plaintiff's costs are compared with the tremendous expenses that 
must otherwise be borne by each of the defendants. And, of 
course, if the request for certification were found to be groundless, 
the defendant could be appropriately sanctioned.2u5 To the extent 
that certification in a complex case helps focus the issues, it may 
actually facilitate rather than delay prompt resolution of dis- 
puted issues. And even if certification does not speed the case of 
the particular plaintiff, there is good reason to think it will expe- 
dite the processing of complex litigation in general, thereby bene- 
fiting the courts, other litigants seeking places on crowded calen- 
dars, and the public a t  large. 
204. See notes 70-74 and accompanying text supra. 
205. See note 56 and accompanying text supra. 
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Perhaps the deepest concern from a plaintiffs standpoint is 
that in the process of alleviating risks of discovery abuse, certifi- 
cation will provide defendants with a veil behind which damaging 
information might remain concealed. There are two distinct di- 
mensions of the problem of potential concealment. The first in- 
volves the risk of placing the plaintiff in a "Catch-22" situation 
-requiring plaintiff to adduce additional information to justify 
its claim before allowing discovery to proceed, while depriving it 
of the means to gain such information.206 The second involves 
the risk that forcing the plaintiff to telegraph how much it al- 
ready knows about a claim may simultaneously indicate how 
little it knows, thereby allowing a defendant the opportunity to 
secrete or destroy damaging information of which the plaintiff has 
no inkling. 
Of the two concealment issues, the second is probably less 
serious as a practical matter. The disclosure by plaintiff of the 
facts in his possession might well deprive him of a certain tactical 
advantage. However, since elimination of surprise a t  trial is one 
of the main purposes of discovery,207 i t  would be inconsistent for 
the plaintiff to argue that he should be allowed to go forward with 
discovery so that he may keep defendant from learning just "how 
much" he "knows." He must therefore rely on the contention that 
disclosure of facts in his possession would invite the defendants 
to engage in the destruction of documents and obfuscation of the 
discovery process. 
Disclosure, however, would be unlikely to have this result. 
First, the disclosure of enough facts to satisfy a certification pro- 
cedure does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff has disclosed 
all of the facts within its possession. Accordingly, certification 
does not put the defendant in a position to second-guess the ex- 
tent of the plaintiffs knowledge. Second, the destruction of any 
documents or the withholding of information sought in discovery 
is a dangerous tactic. I t  is extremely difficult to insure that the 
other party will never learn about such destruction or retention 
through copies, memoranda that refer to such documents, or even 
the testimony of individuals who knew the documents existed or 
participated in their destruction or withholding. Any possible 
damage that could be inflicted by sensitive documents is greatly 
outweighed by the prejudice done to the whole case by the revela- 
206. Cf. Withrow & Larm, supra note 13, at 27 (referring to the difficulty of determin- 
ing the extent to which issue definition should precede extensive discovery as a "chicken 
and egg" problem). 
207. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 58, $ 2001, at 17 & n.16 (1970). 
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tion of an attempt to suppress such information. In the post- 
Watergate era, disapproval of attorneys who take ethical sabbati- 
cals and the public's inherent suspicion of large organizations 
demand that a corporation be extremely circumspect with its 
document retention policies and that it be as liberal as possible 
in the production of documents. Finally, the slow but steady hand 
of a state bar disciplinary committee is always looming in the 
background in the form of actions directed against attorneys im- 
plicated in document destruction or discovery obfuscation.20R 
The most difficult problem in structuring an evenhanded 
certification procedure is striking a proper balance between the 
need to keep the doors of the judicial process open to plaintiffs 
with meritorious claims and closing those doors to those who 
exploit the present system to extort nuisance value settlements. 
Achievement of such a balance necessarily depends upon the 
sound exercise of judicial discretion on a case-by-case basis, but 
certain factors may be identified to help guide such discretion. 
As has been stressed throughout this Article, the certification 
device should be invoked only in a narrow range of complex cases. 
Generally, it would only be appropriate in those involving a sig- 
nificant number of parties and particularly nebulous allegations. 
Certification is perhaps most likely to be appropriate in complex 
cases where the initial pleadings are devoid of any allegations 
actually tying each defendant into the claims averred. In addi- 
tion, a judge should consider the relative intrusiveness of poten- 
tial discovery. Where a claim is likely to spawn discovery requests 
that will send a dragnet through a defendant's business records 
and disrupt normal operations, there is a stronger call for certifi- 
cation than where a claim is made with sufficient specificity that 
discovery requests can be more narrowly confined. A closely re- 
lated factor is the extent of the disproportion between the likely 
cost of early discovery to the respective parties. Still another 
factor is the availability of pertinent information to the plaintiff 
without discovery. A plaintiff should not be allowed to search 
indiscriminately through all the information in the defendant's 
possession when it has access to information which might narrow 
the scope of its claim, thereby narrowing the range of needed 
discovery, and lessening the burden on the defendant. 
Vague conspiracy allegations pose a particularly sensitive 
problem which a viable certification procedure must be able to 
208. A lawyer would be subject to disciplinary action, for example, for concealing or 
knowingly failing to disclose "that which he is required by law to reveal." ABA CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR ?'-lO2(A) (3). 
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handle. Because of the very nature of the covert activity involved, 
discovery may be the only means of obtaining particulars to sup- 
port the allegations. Often facts sufficient to establish a conspir- 
acy claim crystalize only after bits of circumstantial evidence are 
distilled from information obtained by extensive discovery. In a 
somewhat analogous context, Professors Areeda and Turner cau- 
tion against early foreclosure of On the other hand, 
the conspiracy count in an antitrust case is all too often merely a 
stretch of boilerplate language thrown into a pleading as a catch- 
all. Allowing plaintiffs to bootstrap their way into extensive dis- 
covery on the basis of conclusory conspiracy allegations may thus 
be tantamount to tolerating discovery abuse. 
The Portland Retail Druggists2l0 case suggests that  the certi- 
fication procedure is flexible enough to deal with this problem. 
There the effect of the certification order was to stay discovery 
on the conspiracy claims while allowing discovery to go forward 
on the substantive antitrust issues. Generally, if the conspiracy 
existed a t  all, discovery on substantive issues would be sufficient 
to turn up either proof of conspiracy or information which would 
suffice for compliance with a certification order. Used in this 
manner, certification may constitute a useful discovery ordering 
technique. A court may allow a plaintiff to "pry open the crypt" 
in search of suspected conspiratorial conduct as soon as it can 
certify a t  least some hint of the corpse. 
By scrupulously balancing the risks of delay and conceal- 
ment against the potential for abuse, judicial discretion can steer 
a sound middle course between the Scylla of undue discovery 
limitations on plaintiffs and the Charybdis of spiraling discovery 
burdens on innocent defendants. If used with appropriate re- 
straint, the certification device promises to be a balanced and 
sensitive device for eliminating blatant forms of discovery abuse 
in complex cases. 
209. In discussing the hesitancy with which a judge should approach granting sum- 
mary judgment, Professors Areeda and Turner note . 
that early disposition might prematurely save the defendant from the exposure 
of his wrong. Many of the key facts are peculiarly within the defendant's knowl- 
edge. The existence of a conspiracy, for example, will be hidden from the world; 
knowledge can be expected to replace conjecture only after discovery. . . . And 
motive or intent can only be speculated about in advance of discovery or trial. 
2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 4 316, at  60 (1978). 
210. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (D. Ore., 
filed Aug. 6, 1971); see notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra. 
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B. Sanctions 
In the last analysis, certification can be expected to have a 
salutary effect on the pretrial process only if the sanctions behind 
it are strong enough to induce compliance and deter the types of 
abuses it is designed to curtail. Generally, one would expect that 
the mere fact a party cannot proceed with discovery until the 
certification process is completed would be sufficient inducement 
for compliance. In difficult cases, however, more stringent sanc- 
tions such as involuntary dismissal and imposition of costs and 
attorneys' fees may be necessary. These constitute basic mecha- 
nisms with which the court may fashion a full range of measures 
to deal with noncompliance. Therefore, it will be useful to exam- 
ine the sources of authority for these sanctions before proceeding 
to outline the ways in which a judge might match sanctions with 
types of noncompliance. 
1. Involuntary dismissal 
out 
tiff 
COU 
The conditions governing involuntary dismissals are spelled 
in Rule 41(b), which provides that "[flor failure of the plain- 
to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of 
rt, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any 
claim against him."211 Because of the severity of the dismissal 
sanction, case law makes i t  clear that Rule 41(b) should be ap- 
plied very sparingly.21z At the same time, there is authority that, 
despite the language of the rule, involuntary dismissal may be 
ordered on the court's own motion.213 
While there are numerous cases in which actions have been 
dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with orders 
analogous to certification orders,214 the ultimate availability of a 
Rule 41(b) dismissal as a sanction in such situations is adequately 
displayed in Von Poppenheim v. Portland Boxing & Wrestling 
211. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). 
212. J.F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F.2d 1318, 
1324-25 (7th Cir. 1976); Von Poppenheim v. Portland Boxing & Wrestling Comm'n, 442 
F.2d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U S .  1039 (1972). 
213. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U S .  626, 629-33 (1962); Darlington v. Studebaker- 
Packard Corp., 261 F.2d 903,905 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U S .  992 (1959); Hicks v. 
Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 115 F.2d 406, 408-09 (9th Cir. 1940). 
214. See, e.g., Fendler v. Westgate-California Corp., 527 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1975) 
(dismissed for failure to limit, as ordered, third amended complaint to explicitly stated 
claims so as to clarify the nature of the action); Package Mach. Co. v. Hayssen Mfg. Co., 
266 F.2d 56, (7th Cir. 1959) (dismissed for failure to furnish more specific statement of 
trade secrets allegedly pirated by defendants). 
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C o m m i ~ s i o n . ~ ~ ~  A professional wrestler brought an antitrust ac- 
tion alleging that the Portland Boxing & Wrestling Commission 
and various other defendants had conspired to restrain trade in 
the wrestling business. Approximately fourteen months after the 
action was originally filed, the district judge requested the plain- 
tiff to submit a detailed pretrial statement to help clarify the 
issues.216 In particular, the court wanted a statement identifying 
with specificity what the conspiracy consisted of, a statement of 
expected testimony, and a description of the role the various 
parties had played in the alleged conspiracy.217 After more than 
a year of patient extensions and the submission of three state- 
ments that failed to comply with the request, the judge finally 
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 4l(b) .218 In 
explaining this decision, the judge stated he had given the plain- 
tiff ample warning and " 'could not allow an antitrust case to 
continue when it was based solely on suspicion.' "219 
Von Poppenheim provides support by analogy for the propo- 
sition that Rule 41(b) dismissal is appropriate where there has 
been repeated noncompliance with a certification order. Admit- 
tedly, the case is distinguishable from the typical situation in 
which certification would be invoked, since the orders occurred 
at  a later stage of the proceeding than would be the case with a 
certification order and discovery was never stayed. In Von 
Poppenheim dismissal was arguably more justified because the 
plaintiff, through discovery, a t  least had access to the informa- 
tion required for the pretrial statement, if such information ex- 
isted at  all, whereas a certification order may completely pre- 
clude a party from seeking information through discovery chan- 
nels pending adequate certification. But it must be remembered 
that the quantum of information required in an adequate certifi- 
cate is really quite small. A plaintiff may comply with a certifica- 
tion order merely by establishing that there is no way to get 
access to certain information short of discovery.220 The certifica- 
215. 442 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039 (1972). 
216. Id. a t  1049. 
217. Id. a t  1050. 
218. Id. a t  1051. 
219. Id. a t  1052 (quoting the district court order). 
One of the interesting points about the Ninth Circuit's affirmance of Von Poppenheim 
is its suggestion that "less drastic alternatives should first be considered before dismissing 
an action under Rule 41(b)." Id. at 1053. See also Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. 
Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 1338-39 (9th Cir. 1970). Significantly, certification 
would constitute just such a "less drastic alternative" in many cases, since it can normally 
induce party compliance without relying on the austere dismissal sanction. 
220. See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra. 
350 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1978: 
tion procedure will thus bar discovery from going forward alto- 
gether only if the plaintiff is unable to persuade the district court 
that there is some likelihood relevant material would emerge if 
discovery were allowed. Accordingly, manifest inability to comply 
with a certification order is arguably as good a basis for a Rule 
41(b) dismissal as was repeated noncompliance with the order in 
Von Poppenheim. As the Ninth Circuit emphasized in that case, 
there comes a point a t  which the "rights of the defendants to be 
free from costly and harrassing litigation"221 and limitations on 
judicial time and energy outweigh the right of a would-be plaintiff 
to maintain his action.222 
2. Attorneys' fees and related expenses 
While Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. u. Wilderness SocietyZn 
reaffirmed the American rule that, absent specific statutory au- 
thority to the contrary, each party must bear its own counsel 
expenses, the Court there explicitly recognized that "a court may 
assess attorneys' fees . . . when the losing party has 'acted in bad 
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons . . . . ' "224 
This exception has typically been construed narrowlynr and ap- 
plied only in egregious cases.226 Because the quantum of informa- 
tion necessary to pass the certification threshold is so minimal, 
however, there is a strong likelihood that, at least in some cases, 
noncompliance with a certification order would involve "bad 
faith" of sufficient magnitude to justify the imposition of this 
sanction. 
In the most extreme cases, it might be appropriate to tax 
litigation expenses to the plaintiff's attorney. One possible basis 
for this course is 28 U.S.C. 8 1927 which provides that: "[alny 
attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case as to 
increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by 
- - 
221. 442 F.2d a t  1054. 
222. Id. 
223. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
224. Id. a t  258-59 (quoting F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber 
Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)). 
225. See Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 599-600 (3d Cir. 1976); Adams v. 
Carlson, 521 F.2d 168, 170 (7th Cir. 1975). 
226. E.g., McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109, 1112 (1st Cir. 1971) (assessment 
of plaintiffs fees despite dismissal of action because plaintiff had to go to court to vindi- 
cate previously established constitutional right to a statement of reasons for nonrenewal 
of contract by state college); Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963) (continued 
pattern of evasion and obstruction with respect to school desegregation); Rolax v. Atlantic 
Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951) (discriminatory and oppressive conduct by 
labor union made individual suit by black workers necessary). 
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the court to satisfy personally such excess costs."2n As originally 
enacted this provision may have referred only to costs of court in 
the narrow, traditional sense which does not include attorneys' 
fees,lZ8 but in recent years there has been some scholarly sugges- 
tion that its scope is broad enough to permit shifting more of the 
litigation expense burden in suitable cases? As indicated by one 
author, "when any person under the authority of the court takes 
a position dishonestly or frivolously and expenses arise from that 
action, that person should pay full compen~a t ion . "~~~  It  will also 
be recalled from the discussion of Rule 11 that a court imposed 
expenses upon the attorney who derived his defendant list from 
the Philadelphia telephone directory.231 Where the attorney has 
been instrumental in bringing a "bad faith" harassment action, 
personal liability for resulting burdens upon others seems clearly 
justified. 
The recently proposed amendment of Rule 37(e) bears di- 
rectly on the issue of awarding litigation expenses in appropriate 
cases. The new subdivision would allow a court in its discretion 
to "impose upon any party or counsel such sanctions as may be 
just, including the payment of reasonable expenses and attor- 
ney's fees" for failure to cooperate in framing a discovery plan or 
for abuse of the discovery process "in seeking, making or resisting 
discovery."232 The Advisory Committee recognized that while pro- 
tective orders under Rule 26(c) and section 1927 sanctions are 
available, they are seldom invoked. The Committee therefore 
concluded that the proposed change was necessary "to make ex- 
plicit the power of the court to impose sanctions for all forms of 
discovery abuse."233 Insofar as failure to provide a discovery cer- 
tificate represents such an abuse, the new Rule 37(e), if adopted, 
provides ample authority for shifting the burden of expenses 
occasioned by filing of an action without adequate basis. 
227. 28 U.S.C. 4 1927 (1970). 
228. See Risinger, supra note 109, at 47-48. The section has consistently been so 
applied. E.g., 1507 Corp. v. Henderson, 447 F.2d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 1971), and cases cited 
therein. 
229. See Risinger, supra note 109, at 47-51; Note, Civil Procedure-Power of Federal 
Courts to Discipline Attorneys for Delay in Pre-trial Procedure, 38 NOTRE DAME LAW. 158, 
168-69 (1963); 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 947-48 (1962). 
230. Risinger, supra note 109, at 51. 
231. See Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975, 983 
(E.D. Pa. 1973); notes 105-08 and accompanying text supra. 
232. 1978 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 6, at 35 (emphasis added). 
233. Id. at 36 (emphasis added). 
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3. Range and flexibility of sanctions 
We can now summarize the possible sanctions for noncompli- 
ance with a certification order. The most severe sanction would 
involve dismissing the action and requiring either the plaintiff or 
his attorney to defray all expenses defendants incurred in defend- 
ing the suit, including attorneys' fees. This burden could be 
scaled down in appropriate circumstances by dismissing the ac- 
tion and awarding attorneys' fees and costs, but not other defense 
expenses, and could be reduced still further by simply dismissing 
the action and allocating court costs in accordance with conven- 
tional procedures. In certain cases, where it appears the attorney 
has been operating in bad faith, but has filed a good cause of 
action against a t  least some defendants, it may be appropriate to 
impose some or all of the foregoing expenses on the guilty attor- 
ney, without dismissing the underlying claim. I t  is also conceiva- 
ble that where a plaintiff's first certificate was inadequate but a 
second was deemed sufficient, the court might impose on the 
plaintiff the defendant's costs incurred in preparation for the 
challenge to the first certificate. If a party did comply with a 
certification order but the facts certified were ultimately proven 
false, or the certification was made in bad faith, the plaintiff or 
its counsel might be subject to perjury sanctions, or at  a bare 
minimum, to those provided by Rule 11. Assuming that facts 
were certified in good faith, but plaintiffs allegations were later 
determined to be without merit, it might still be appropriate in 
certain circumstances for costs to be imposed in a manner that 
would place the expenses of early discovery on the plaintiff. And 
finally, as indicated at  the outset, the mere deprivation of the 
right to proceed with discovery would probably be sufficient sanc- 
tion to insure adequate compliance with the certification proce- 
dure in most cases. 
As the foregoing summary of possible sanctions makes clear, 
a judge would have great flexibility in tailoring any sanctions 
imposed to the needs and circumstances of particular cases. The 
more drastic sanctions of dismissal and imposition of attorneys' 
fees and other costs should be reserved for dealing with cases of 
egregious noncompliance with a certification order and fairly bla- 
tant abuses of the federal procedural system. The determination 
of whether various costs should be borne by a plaintiff or his 
attorney would of course turn on where culpability for abuse lies. 
A plaintiff with an arguably valid claim should not be prejudiced 
by the m'alfeasance of his attorney unless the reality of the partic- 
ular attorney-client relationship conforms to the legal theory that 
2991 DISCOVERY CERTIFICATION 353 
the attorney is merely an agent acting at  the behest of his client- 
principal. The fact that an attorney had a reputation for or record 
of bringing spurious suits might weigh in favor of imposing a 
stiffer sanction.234 In general, the sanctions applied in connection 
with the certification procedure should be applied in a manner 
which will avoid undue severity and ultimately facilitate moving 
a case forward into the normal discovery track if the case war- 
rants judicial disposition. However, where the certification iden- 
tifies spurious claims, and particularly where a plaintiff's bad 
faith continues through the certification process, sanctions 
should be applied which will adequately compensate a defendant 
for the effects of the objectionable tactics of the plaintiff or its 
counsel. 
One of the most notable difficulties with the initial applica- 
tions of the certification procedure in Portland Retail Druggists 
and Mountain View was the uncertainty of the judges in those 
cases as to the legitimacy of the certification device. As a result, 
an undue amount of time was spent puzzling about the court's 
power to invoke what appeared to be a salutary procedural de- 
vice. Our analysis has demonstrated that such judicial hesitancy 
is needless. Assuming that one is faced with a case of sufficient 
complexity, there are adequate grounds within the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and the inherent power of a court to authorize 
use of the certification device. Exercised with appropriate re- 
straint, certification promises to be an effective tool for managing 
discovery and curbing a limited but extremely egregious form of 
discovery abuse. Normal discovery sanctions are often too harsh 
or insufficiently flexible, hence judges become reluctant to invoke 
them and abusive discovery goes unchecked. Because of its great 
flexibility, certification can reach some of the abuses that often 
slip past normal discovery sanctions and aid the court in manag- 
ing the course of discovery. Postponing access to discovery 
through certification is an appreciably milder sanction than oth- 
ers authorized by the Federal Rules, and its use will help to equal- 
ize early discovery burdens in complex cases. At a time when 
judges are looking for mechanisms to assist them in controlling 
discovery abuse, certification may thus be a particularly useful 
device in appropriate cases. 
234. Cf. AAA v. Rothman, 104 F. Supp. 655, 656 (E.D.N.Y. 1952) (judge ordered 
filing for future reference the name of an attorney who knowingly put forth a groundless 
claim). 
